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THE 'lHBOLOGY AND IANGUAGB OP RU~LF BUL'IMANN 
Chapter I shall serve as a_ summary for this paper. I take ·the 
liberty of speaking in the f irst· ·person in_ order to specify what my 
concern has been, and to summarize the conclusions I have reached. 
In this study I have attempted to determine ,fhat influence Rudolf 
Bultmann's theology bas had upon his usage of language. 'Ibis attempt 
has led, simultaneously, to the characterization of his view of 
language. P.inally, I have attempted a critical evaluation of his 
theology, and with it a concurrent evaluation of the view of lan-
guage which finds its genesis within that theology. 
My purpose has been twofold. ~ have set as an objective a more 
intimate knowledge of Bultmann's theology. In addition, I have had 
as a purpose to demonstrate that a theologian's view of language and 
its usage are ~etermined largely by the theology developed. Par 
Bultmann'.s attempt to theologize not only exe1'>1if ies· his view of 
language in action; it also fashions and constructs the view of lan-
guage which is mirrored in such an expression. 
It·was a difficult matter to determine what the exact boundaries 
of the study should_ ·be. Almost immediately I discovered that a st~dy. 
of Bultmann's theology was necessary if I wished to investigate his 
view of language. But such a study of theology was to be a means to 
an end, and not the end itself. On the other hand, the theology of 
Bultmann is so cohesive that the task, once begun, had to be carried 
through to completion. 'lbroughout the study, the explication of his . . . 
2 
theology· was carried on solely to determine what view of language was 
his. In a similar vein, the critique and analysis of that theology 
was to serve the purpose of demonstrati~g the positive and negative 
aspects of his view of language. 
Within the boundaries described, I attempted to reach a descrip-
tion of Bultmann's "view of language." When this term is used, it 
refers to the philosophy overarching the use of symbolic forms. I 
began with- the presupposition that language in some way utilizes man's 
.Ability to symbolize. Por man is able to symbolize his own 
thought-processes, objects outside of himself, and the relation 
between these t\«>. A view of language, then, is the overarching 
princ-iple or rul~ one adopts in his process of symbolizing. It follows 
necessarily th,1t one's interpretation of man (and hence of his 
thought-process), the object~ outside of him, and the relation between-
such a group of interpretations will vitally affect ·on6' s view of lan-
guage. Bultmann's theology, his interpretation of these factors and 
their inter-relation, was held to be the key to his vie\"/ of language. 
I began the study with a consideration of .. Bultmann's theology 
as it affected his view of language. Looking first at his major 
presuppositions, I advanced to a consideration of existential analysis 
and the existentiell moment, the process of demythoiogizing as a con-
sequent of his methodological approach, the kervea as judgment and 
grace, and faith as immune from ei_ther proof or disproof. I then 
turned to the view of theological language which had emerged. After 
considering the theological presuppositions of his language and dis-
cussi.ng a tentative definition or· "language" for him, I examined 
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one of his sermons to determine if his view of language was e~ li-
fied there. In the last chapter of the paper, I evaluated his theology 
(and the resultant view of language) from within his own system, and 
then from vantage points outside of the system. 
In t.,_is study I have found that a view of .language does indeed ·· 
emerge from the theology of Rudolf Bultmann. Por it becomes apparent 
that Bultmann's transfexelice::.: of Heidegger's categories of existen-
tialia into his own system is an_ eventful step in the process of r: . .... . 
constructing a frame for language. lbese existentialia serve as 
categories of existential being mirrored in the archetypes of language. 
In addition, just as there are existentiel.1 moments which either 
authenticate or inauthenticate the existential possibilities 
Cexistentialia), so it appears that there are referents for the 
linguistic archetypes which give .these · archetypes the ring of. either 
authenticity or unauthenticity. As a result, language for Bultmann 
is the process of attributing authentic referents to archetypes, 
simultaneously displacing the unauthentic refere~ts and the unauthen-
• 
tic archetypes which have been created by such referents. It is 
this view of language which suffers under criticism of his theology .• 
• 
Por ther, are aspects of his fra~e of thought which demonstrate 
inconsistency even within the system. In addition, when his system 
is evaluated from without, some glarjng inadequacies quickly appear. 
· Por Bultmann has committed to phenomenological existential analysis 
the question of ultimate Being. He has dismissed the usage of obj~c-
tive language:as meaningless. 'Ibe applicatlon of criticism to these 
,I 
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inadequacies shakes the very bedrock of his view of language. His 
theology suffers a double blow: it must recognize its own shortcomings; 
and it must concede that its supr,or·t for a view of lan~uage has "been 
weakened. 
The major sources utilized in this study were primarily from 
Bultmann's own hand. The two translated volumes of Xerypa and Myth; 
his Bssays 1 Philosophical and Theological; the recently translated 
volume of monographs entitled Bxistence and Paith; the sermonic 
compendium., 'Ibis ~\forld and Beyond; and his apologetic work, Jesus 
Christ and Mytholosx ... these works were the major sources. Utilized 
in the evaluatative and interpretative task were John Macguarrie's 
'Dle Scope ·of Demythologizing• and Leopold Malevez•· 'lbe Christian 
. . 
Message and Myth. In an attempt at objectivity, I allowed the 
the authors to speak in their ·ow.a words whenever possible. 
\fl1ile there is a good deal of writing which concerns itse;f with 
Bultmann's theology, both commendatory and critical, I have found no 
examination of the view of language which Bultmann holds. It seems 
that no lines of acmmunication between the modern philosophy of 
analysis and t~e realm of existen~ial theology have been constructed. 
Por there is little concern for Bultmann's view of language among 
his critics, even though the world of philosophy is alive with 
li~guistic analysis. 
This research pr~ject has allowed me to advance to some depth 
in the theology of a modern thinker, although admit·tedly the depths 
have not been plum.bed. In addition, X have been permitted :.to• see 
s 
both the importance and the validity of the question of meaning 
which the advanced-logical positivists are askJng al$o of the theo-
logians of our modern era. For in final analysis, the study of 
language is the study of meaning; from such a study theologians 
and· their works ar·e not exempt. 
.. 
CHAPTBR II 
1HB THBOLOGY OP RUDOLF BUtmAmr . 
1'heological Pac·tors in His View of Language 
Oile can assume that the theology of Audolf Bultmann will have a 
. . 
very definite influence upon _any t~eory of language which he might 
espouse, either consciously or_ unconsciously. Por if Bultmann's 
theology deals with ultimate truth, then certainly the spoken- truth, 
as well as the method utilized in forming that spoken truth, will be a 
reflection of t~t ultimate truth. If there is a metaphysic to be 
found in the theology of Rudolf Bultmann, then it can be assumed that 
the method employed to speak of such a metaphysic ·wi.11 surely be 
" 
selected with care. Bultmann·'s use of analogy in the construction of 
theology is not an unconscious selectiQn. His theology definitely 
influences t~e way in which_he·speaks. -It ·is ~ecessary, therefore~ if 
. . 
we wish to determine what Bultmann's view of language is, for us to 
review the basic tenets of his theology. With that purpose in mind, 
we now turn to a ·consideration-of ·his theology, desiring thereby to 
isolate those aspects of the same which play a significant role in 
his view of language, either consciously or unconsciously. 
~ny review of the theology of Rudolf B~tlmann must begin of 
. . . 
necessity with the basic assumptions which he-selects. The success 
which we have in isolating such assumptions will determine, to a large 
degree, the success we shall have in reviewing bis theology as a whole. 
7 
lbe first and most influential presupposition which is Bultmann's 
is that all theology is to be expressed ·in term:•-· -of man's existence. 
Putting this assumption conversely, one could say that for Bultmann 
all theology is nothing more, nor less, than an attempt to clarify 
man'·s self-understanding. It is . possible, therefore-, to speak of God 
only insofar as He impinges upon man's self-understanding. As a conse-
quence, it is totally irrele.vant to speak of God as He is "in H elf": 
'lbe incomprehensibility of ·God lies not in the spher~ of theo-
retical thought but in the sphere of personal existence. Not 
,mat God is in Himself, but how he acts with men, is the mystery 
in which faith is interested. 1bis is a- mystery not to theore-
tical thought, but to the natural wills and desires of men.1. 
Bultmann reminds us of the logical positivist·s in his .method of sti-
pulating what areas of thoughtare meaningful when one wishes to dis-
cuss God. "Only such statement_s about God are legitimate as express 
the existential relation between God and man. 112 His emphasis upon 
the existential relation between God and man is reminiscent of his 
contemporary, Martin Buber.3 
Since bis discussion about God must be £or.related with God's 
relation to man, Bultmann is not interested in investigating, within 
theological research, "existence within faith~·•~ but rather the 1 
. . 
"nat~al man. 114 His approach to· the Bible is also made in terms of 
this natural man, ·even when this approach is made within the Church 
itself: "I think ·I may take for granted that the righ-t question to 
frame with regard to the Bible~at any rate within the Church--is the 
question of human existence. 11S 
Bultmann's major assumption, that theology is possible only in · 
-terms of man's existence, is a commitment to carry on all theological 
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endeavor for the .advancement of man's self-understanding. Po·r behind 
the assumption that all theology must be relative to man's existence 
is tbe ·assumption that self-understanding is the most important aspect. 
of man's existence. He argues, then, that all theologizing must be 
carried on ,a.th the goal of nurturing self-und~rstanding ~thin exist-
ence.· In discussing what benefits Christianity as an oriental reli-
gion brought to the west, he isolates the "ne,f possibilities for the 
understanding of human existence~6 as the most important and influen-
tial gift transliterated by Christianity. In attempting-to filter· 
out Bultmann's presuppositions, Barth suggests that "prior under-
standing," the fact that all understanding is concerned in one way or 
. . 
another with man's understanding of himself, is the primary ground 
rule of Bultmann's thought. 7 Bultmann's concern with theology as:it 
relates to man's existential situa_tion, -his self-understanding, is no 
aftertho-ught. Rather, it is a primary assumption which will have 
ramifications throughout his theology. "Die Begriff der SelbstveJ:-
stlndnis bei Bultmann hat nun ,eittragende theologische IConsequenzen, 
denen man nicbt ohne weiteres zustimm.en muss und kann."8 
Bultmann's primary assumption will not only have effects upon 
his whole theology; it will also grossly affect any attempt at delin-
eating his view 0£ language. If .it is true that all theological lan-
guage can be uttered only from within the existence of man, the logi-
cal question to be asked is, \'lhat- are the determinative rules o_f such 
a language? 'Ibis procedure ~f subsuming al_l!·theolo·gy .and· ·a.11 ·.thea~: · ~-
logical language _to an aspect of self-understanding will affect lan-
guage in many ways. · 'lbere will ·be no room for "objective•• language 
9 
of any sort or kind. All valid and meaningful language will by its 
nature have referents within the sphere of human existence and 
self-understanding. _Pinally, since self-understanding is a condition 
of the "moment,·•~ a situation only of the present, all language can 
deal only with the present situation if it is to be valid and mean~ 
ingful. All of these overarching rules of language flow from this 
one major assumption; these particular aspects of Bultmann's linguis-
tic view will become more clear as we proceed. 
'lbe second major methodological assumption of Bultmann flows 
from the first. We consider it as a separate presupposition for the 
sake of clarity. This assumption is that no theological formulations 
are to be constructed in a subject-object form. While.the fi~st assump-
tion dealt with theology as a whole, the second deals specifically 
with theological formulations. Bultmann is in revolt against those 
who desire to place God in the sphere of natural reality, and ma~e Him 
only.quantitatively differ~nt. He is offended by those who would speak 
of God as Another a1110ng many. Par him, God is qualitatively differ-
ent, and any formulation "about" Him must take a qualitatively differ-
. ent form. _Again we notice a close affinity with.Buber in this regard; 
for Buber distinguishes between the world of I-IT and I-1HOU, al'Jd . 
they are qualitatively different.9 Bultmann, like Buber, is. ready 
to admit the validity and propriety ·of subject-object formulations· 
in the field of science, where man looks at his environment. But he 
denies the validity of such a procedure when man looks at himself.10 
Bven when man looks about himself within the ob.jects of creation, and 
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makes the some,fhat scientific statement.that the nature and history 
,ti.thin which his life takes place are ruled by God's action, even 
sueh a statement as ~his can only be .made as a confession; it can -
never be expressed as a general truth.11 
This second major assumption flows from the first. But it is 
not any less important when an attempt is made to formulate Bultmann's 
view of language. Por his rejection of subject-object formulations 
will have repercussions throughout his view of language. T.tue theo-
logical language will never again be able to deal with God as an 
"object" in the sense that the natural sciences differentiate between 
objects quantitatively. 'lbeo·logical language will have to be qualita-
tively different because it deals with God, ,mo is never an objec~, 
~ut qualitatively different from all else. 
Having considered Bultmann's presuppositions as they apply to 
his language, we shall now turn to his theology proper. One might be 
tempted to suggest that we turn to Bultmann's existential analysis 
rather than to his theology, for they seem to be so closely intertwined 
-
so as to be almost inseparable. lbe first major aspect of his theo-
~ogy which we shall consider with a · view to\,rards deciphering his 
language-form is his reliance upon this existential analysis and its 
relation to th~ exis.tentieli moment. While ii; is easily said that 
Bultmann is a "Christian existentialist," it is not quite as easily 
determined ho\f he can be called by that name. It \\10Uld take much 
effort to attempt a definition of existentialism, or "Christian existen-
tialism~; !' The "Christian existentialist" would simultaneously complain 
11 
that any such attempt at definition \10uld be a "dis-heartening" of 
his system. Nevertheless, it remains for us to attempt to describe 
the impact that existential analysis has made upon Bultmann's theo-
logy, and his view of language. We shall begin by demonstrating his 
reliance upon Heidegger's philosophy. We shall then turn to a descrip-
tion of existential analysis. We shall conclude by demonstrating the 
importance of the existentiell moment in his theology and language-view. 
It is, without doubt, advantageous to investigate Dultmann's 
reliance upon Heidegger in any attempt to account for the influence 
of ey.J.stential analysis within his theology. Bultmann claims that all 
he owes to the philosophy of Heidegger is that he has learned from it 
to look at the phenomena themselves. His theology ~as learned fro111 
this philosophy to let itself be taught solely by the phenomena, by 
man, whose structure philosophy seeks to clisclose.12 Brown reminds us 
that Heidegger owes much to his teacher, Husseri.13 Insofar as pheno-
menology attempts to determine the object~ ,mich it grasps, it ~s 
dependent upon Kantian idealism, Bultmann•s objection not\ri.thstanding. 
In delineating more specifically Bultmann's reliance upon Heidegger, 
Malevez suggests that Bultmann expects t,,o indispensable services from 
Heidegger: (1) Heidegger's philosophy, in its understanding of the 
desperate condition of Dasein (distress), provides an existential 
analysis which will give understanding to the aversio a deo; (2) the 
ontology of Heidegger. is able to provide us ,dth the categories appro-
priate for the correct expression of a divine saving-event, wrought 
in Christ, while our fren ncceptance of such an event tdll assure our 
-
12 
authenticity.14 In regard to the second service rendered by Heidegger, 
it is interesting to take notice of the apparent similarity between 
Heidegger's "call" and Bultmann's lterygma: Heidegger describes man 
as "listening" in the moment of decision, for being (Dasein) hears 
itself ca11.1s 
Bultmann's reliance upon Heidegger will have at least t\'JD i11DDed-
·iate effects upon any view of language he might uphold. First, the 
fact that philosophy.will provide theological language with the 
.existential frames necessary to understand the aversio _a deo presup-
poses that this part of language may be misused and: .miShandled~--\>Y 
·those who do not have the true knowledge of the aversio even t~ugh 
they have the framing equipment. This point will be further exempli-
fied at a.later section of the paper. 'lbe second effect of 
Heidegger's philosophy upon Bultmann's view of language will be more 
direct. Por Heidegger has bis o,m vi.ew of language. and we can look 
for its influence within Bultmann • . Heidegger is quick to reje~t any 
consideration of a "thinking subject" as the starting .. point of 
philosophy: 
· If one thing la.~ clear in Heidegger, it is that he decisively 
rejects the thinking subject as the starting-point of philosophy • 
.Bxistence is always the concrete •situation of the self·•s 
involvement with. the world and with other selves.16 
Heidegger must conclude that lan~age too cannot arise from a ''thinking 
subject," but ·must find· its origin within the self's involvement with 
the world and other selves. As such, it can be postulated '.·that for. 
Bultmann language must originate not within the "thin~ng self," but 
within the environment of man's existence. Such a view of language 
13 
· will have its problems, as: we shall note later. 
Now we take up the task of :·describing existential· analysis· as·.it 
plays a role in Bul tmann·'·s· theology. 'lbe reference just •de to the 
origin of language wl.thin existence is a good beginning for an under-
standing of existential analysis. Bultmann asserts that the origin 
of concepts (and hence, of language) lies in actual life: 
If I do not· know friendship itself, then I _also can never 
understand the concept of friendship. Por the origin of concepts 
is not isolated thinking in and by itself, but rather the 
actual life to which thinking belongs.17 
If life, "actual life to which thinking belongs," is the source of 
concepts, then surely it is l«>rthy of further examination. Bultmann 
has reminded us above that he learned from Heidegger to look at the 
phenomena of life in and of themselves. Existential analysis is the 
process of investigating man as7 .he ~:lives· id.thin existence. Bultmann 
recognizes that the philosophy of existentialism has attempted just 
such an examination. He is willing to listen to Heidegge_r•s repor~, 
following his investigation of the pure phenomena of man. Heidegger 
_has cone luded that man, w.i thin his concrete being, can become aware 
of his relatedness to Being as such, whether it is thereby affirmed 
o~ rejected. 'Ihis condition of awareness Heidegger calls "existence" 
(as differentiated from Dasein).18 Heidegger argues that·if one 
muld question Being itself, he -~st approach a human being to do so.19 
'lbe process of question_ing Dasein, in order to relate it to Being 
itself, is existential analysis. 
t'lhile it is not necessary here for us to summarize all that 
Heidegger ha·s found when thus addressing the human being, we must 
14 
note that the possibilities of human existence ("existence" in 
Heidegger's specific sense) can be fairly well established. These 
possibilities \'Ii. thin human existence, these "r,otentialities" ,-,hich 
are capable of being "actualized,•,~ are called by Bultmann existen-: 
tialia. Bultmann is speaking·of such existentialia when he says. 
"Bvery .ontic experience (ns an experience of man) has the ontological 
conditions of its possibility in the human structure and can therefore 
be understood as possible on the basis of this structure. 1120 He 
refers to the "ontological conditions" as part of the "given" of 
. 
human structure. It is just these "ontological conditions," the 
existentialia, that existential analysis commits to the theologian 
for his use as a framework in the questioning of Being itself. 
'Ibe influence of this group of existentialia upon Bultmann's 
view of language is profound. Bultmann quotes Jacob Burckhardt's 
view of language with approval: 
At the peak of culture stands a spiritual miracle: the 
languages whose origin lies in the soul independently of 
an individual people and its individual language.21 
He then goes on to say of himself: 
lb be sure, I can know what light and life are even when it is 
dark and I do not see anything. Bven the blind man knows t•!hat 
light is ••• yet I do not i:eally know it. Por the blind man also 
only really knows whflt light is when he sees, and the person who 
is friendles~- and unloved only really knows what friendship and ·1ove 
are when he finds a friend and is given love.22 
Prom these reference\, it is safe· to say that Bultmann speaks of some 
kindci' · archetypal symbols that are present in each man: (mirrors of 
the existentialia discovered by existential analysis) which allow him 
to develop concepts, and hence lanr,uage. Nevertheless,Bultmann argues 
15 
that man can not really know these archetypes to be valid unti~ he 
has verified them through existential experience. It is apparent, 
then, that the existentialia discovered through existential analysis 
(such as freedom, decision, possibility of e~cistence) are transferred 
into the sphere of language as symbolic archetypes. But these arche-
types are not real until they have been experienced as part of true 
human existence; a verbal reference to the archetypes is not real 
until the archetypes have been "lived through •. '! 
Bultmann is prepared to suggest that the existentialia (and hence 
the archetypes of language) discovered by existential analysis · 
through investigation of the phenomena of man are the tools with 
which the Christian theologian must 1\IOrk. For the basic Christian 
concepts are nothing other than these very same existentialia: 
All of the basic Christian concepts have a content that can 
be determined ontologically prior to faith and in a purely 
rational way. All theological concepts ·contain the understanding 
of being that belongs to -man as such and by himself insofar as 
he exists at a11.23 
In order to appreciate Bultmann·'s transference of such existentialia 
into the realm of Christian theology, it would be helpful for us to 
compare how both he and Heidegger utilize the ontological condition 
(existentiale) "self-understanding·.!' Commenting on Heidegger's and 
Bultmann's "Selbstverstllnclniss," Ittel suggests that Heidegger can 
speak of self-understanding only as Dasein recognizing the existential 
possibility of Being within Dasein itself. Bultmann, meanwhile, 
admits this as a formal definition (an existentiale) 1 and can speak 
of a self-understanding of sorts outside of faith; but he also speaks 
of faith itself as self-understanding.24 We readily see how Bultmann 
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takes over these existentialia, utilizes them as a formal category 
of man's existence, and then goes on to fill them up with kerygmatic 
• meaning. 
Bultmann is ready to admit that a similar transference occurs 
in his utilization of Heidegger's "authentic possibility of being": 
If ICuhlmann(sic) asks me, then, "Is the term •future' as 
Bultmann's theology understands it identical with 'Nlat the 
philosopher Heidegger discovers as •authentic possibility of 
being'?," then I re~ly, Yes indeedl-namely, in a formal or 
ontological sense.2S 
Here Dul tmann refers to the existentialia as "formal.'.! 
Bultmann is prep~red to utilize-existential interpretation., 
"the systematizing of the self-understanding of existence involved 
in existence itself, 1126 because it will enable him to accomplish his 
goal of addressing Being from within the sphere of existence. He 
must utilize existential analysis if he hopes to remain true to his 
commitment to carry on theology only in terms of man's existence. 
Bultmann goes to the length of asserting that it is God's involvement 
,dth man which gives to the existentialia such great significance. 
In this regard, Malevez, the Jesuit, argues that for Bultmann the 
complete existential analysis of Dasein is preparation for the kerygma. 
Por the kerygma t«>uld be meaningless if man did not have some ~ 
"knowledge" of God beforehand. If God ,1ere not secretly troubling 
our existence, never ",«>uld man recognize God as God in any revelation 
of God" (as Bultmann himself says in Bssays, p. 2S7).27 
Bultmann's usage of the existential analysis plays a dominant 
role in the shaping of any view of language he might have. Por it 
appears that the existentialia are the very archetypes of language; 
17 
they are t~e possibilities of authentic existence as they have been 
characterized symbolically from the phenomena of existential analysis. 
lbese archetypes are part of man's existence as it has been analyzed 
by existential interpretation. 'Ibey are of the nature of potentials, 
awaiting the actualization of the concrete moment of speech. And 
just as the concrete moment will either affirm or deny the existen-
tialia, so also it appears that any reference to the symbols of the 
existentialia, the archetypes, ,fill automa~ically be either an autben-
. 
tic or an unauthentic reference. It is impossible to speak of such 
archetypes wi.tho~t one or the other reference • . We now turn to the 
moment, the existentiell, as it assumes a role of importance in the 
existential analysis. 
Bultmann himself explains the difference between existential 
possibility and existentiell: 
Philosophical analysis shows what existence in the abstract 
means. By contrast, existential, personal self-understanding 
does not say ,-,1tat existence means· in the abstract, but points 
to my life as a concrete person _in the here and now. It is an 
act of understanding in •which my very self and the relationships 
in wh~ch I am involved are understood together.28 
Bultmann's differentiation between existentiell and existential possi-
. 
bilities is important. All existentiell possibilities must lie within 
the horizon of existe~tial possibilities·; but· there may be existential 
possibilities which are not existentiell possibilities for a ·given 
individual at a given time.29 For existentiell possibilities occur 
only in the moment of concrete life, while existential possibi~ities 
are the existentialia common to all human beings. Malevez reminds us 
that in order to understand the existentiell ''moment" in Bultmann's 
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usage, one must make ~he differentiation which Bultmann (from 
Heidegger) makes between historiscb and geschichtllch_. Histo~isch 
belongs . to the spher~ which sets f o.rth and expounds objects in th.e 
same way as it does nature. There is a different kind of history, 
Geschichte, with which we are to be concerned in Dasein. Since it 
has nothing to do with nature, a given, ready-made thing, it ·exists 
only by.creating itself in a free decision. "This decision is taken 
in confrontation of the Being which encounters the human Being 
existentielly." It is in such existentiell encounters, moments, 
that man personalizes himself as apart from the objective.30 
Bultma-nn's. own words, ·in Kerygma and Myt~, are: "lfe possess the pre-
sent through encounter, and encounter imposes · the necessity of 
decision. tt31 It is evident that in Bultmann•·s "now, 11 the past as 
wel~ as the future are subsumed. 'lbere is no meaning for either of 
. . 
them when contrasted ,dth the present moment.32 '!be existentiell, 
then, is the actualization of the potential inherent in exis-tentialia 
possibilities. The moment of concrete decision within existence 
gives either an authentic or an unauthentic ring to the existential 
. possibility. lbe moment actually compresses th~ past and the future 
in a decisive concrete situation. 
Bultmann's discussion of "decisio·n now" can perhaps throw some 
light onto his cir~le of language. He suggests ·that decision rests 
"in what at any given time I already am." As natur~l man, a man is 
a sinner; that is, he is tied down more and.mo·re to_ what he already 
is. Bultma_nn further argues that the past is c_a·nstan·tly called into 
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question by the future in every meeting of the "now." A Christian 
can make himself receptive to the future, "which is making itself 
accessible in what confronts me 'now•. 1133 Is it unfair to suggest 
that the language which arises in the moment of self-understanding 
1'1ill be language with authentic referents for the archetype under 
consideration existentiellI? Any_ other referents will be unauthen-
tic. \'lith any other procedure, the "moment" ,ri.11 not be the moment 
of truth in which a Christian makes himself receptive to the future. 
If the moment-decision proves itself unauthentic, that is, if man 
will not face being within existence; then such a decision (or lack 
of decision), failing to provide self-understanding, will itself pro-
vide the archetype (existentiale) ·with unauthentic referents from the 
context of the concrete situation. Por Bultmann has commented in 
reply to Jaspers that when the "objectivity of what is said and the 
subjectivity of the speaker" coincide, it is not due or attributable 
to the "Enco1npassing," as Jaspers would argue; instead, it is due to 
the Encounter and Summons which come to man in the historicity of 
human existence, the "moment.1134 Is this saying _other than that the 
archetype is attributed with authentic referents from within the 
surrounding concrete situation in the momentary decision? 
Bultmann has enumerated some of the characteristics of that 
"moment" which bestow true belief in God. The moment cannot be 
derived from anything; its potentialities for the future lie open; 
its character and demand call for decision; it is rich in possibilit-
ies for joy and gratitude, pain and repentance, duty and love; it is 
rich in "decision" possibilities, and in such decisions man either 
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loses or gains· his real existence.3S Now we are at liberty to discuss 
the M>rd "God" as it comes to light in the moment. Por if the moment 
provides insight and self-understanding, if it allows man to "gain his 
· . real exist~nce," _then the a·rchetype nbeing" will receive authentic 
referentsi the resultant ,«>~d will be uttered: "God"- nothing more 
nor less than the archetype being.with authentic referents at the 
moment. For Bultmann defines truth as 
the reality of God, and·the knowledge of it as the knowledge 
of God ••• knowledge of "the moment," the ''moment" in coming 
into contact with which Cbd's gift and God's demand, his 
judgment and his grace meet us both as a call to action and 
as a call to the acceptance of our destiny.36 
Belief ~n ~d does not come as a result of insight from observation, 
but it is born in truth from surrender to the claims of the moment. 
"lb belief, God ·is t~e incomprehensible, enigmatic power that surges 
through my concrete life and sets limits to it.1137 The moment alone 
provides the opportunity for a proper detacbm~nt from things; the 
moment alone provides authentic referents from the sphere of con-
crete life for the archetype ''being," achieving, according to Bultmann, 
a submission and acknowledgement that life is not "what I will, but 
what thou wilt.1138 'Ibis is to believe in God. 
Bxistential analysis, then, provides a most interesting insight 
into Bultmann's view of language. It \«>uld be incorrect for us to 
assume that Bultmann's view of language will be formed without recourse 
to the process of existential analysis with its existenti•lia and 
existentiell. 'lbe archetypes of language correspond to the existen-
tialia of human existence uncovered by existential analysis. Just as 
these existentialia can be either authenticated or not authenticated 
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by the 111011lent of existentiell possibility, so it seems proper to 
suggest that the symbolic archetypes will be given either authentic 
or l,lrlauthentic referents,_ depending upon the decisive action of the 
human being within the moment of the concrete situation. Bither 
consciously or unconsciously, Bultmann is beginning t~ provide us 
with bis own view of authentic language as it arises from within. the 
sphere of authentic existence. We must now·turn to the question of 
demythologizing as part of Bultmann's theology in order to see what 
facets of his view of language this process will provide us. 
"Demythologizing11 and "Bultmann" have been synonymous terms ever 
since the appearance of "New Testament and Mythology" in 1941. It 
is evident at the slightest study that demythologizing_follotvs necessari-
, 
ly for Bultmann. But he did not begin his work ,dth demythologizing, 
. :-
and proceed from that point. Rather, assuming the presupr,ositions 
mentioned above, Bul~ann arrived at the process of demythol9gizing 
.;as a natural consequent. In this brief survey of the process of de-
mythologizing, we shall look firstly. at the modern world and modern 
man as they provide the "concrete moment" for the process; then we shall 
turn to the meaning of myth for Bultmann; finally we shall see that 
. demythologizing demonstrates that meaningful language •~Y dea1_·only 
with authentic being, in Bultmann's thought~ 
Bultmann finds within the order of modern man an ex post facto 
rationalization for the process of demythologizing. He characterized 
modernity in the way that be did in order to make the process of 
demythologizing more palatable to the preachers and the theologians 
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who were to read "New Testament and Mythology·;" and understand it as 
Bultmann's ·first att·empt at anything like demythologizing. For in 
that essay, although not within his system with its presuppositions, 
demythologizing begins with modern man. Modern man's advance in 
science bas real~y been an advance in self-understanding related to 
the world of things. It would be foolish, Bultmann suggests, to ask 
man to backtrack and visualize himself in the same crtde way as the 
New Testament man considered himself related to the world in which 
.he lived. Bul~mann criticizes the New Testament world-view from 
the position of modern science. How much sense does a three-tiered 
universe, the presence of spirits., and the contradictions inherent 
in the New Testament, make to the_lllOdern mind?39 He calls attention 
to the contradictory feature·s of the )lew· Testament, especially its 
assertion that human life is controlled by cosmic forces, add. at the 
same time challenged.to decision.40 Speaking of the death ~nd resurrec-
tion of Christ (which under gnostic. influence were transformed from 
isolated facts which concerned Christ alone into a cosmic event 
involving all.)-, . he remarks that 
It is only with effort that modern man can think himself back 
into such -an intellectual atmo~phere, and even then- he could 
-never accept it himself, because it regards man's essential 
being as nature, and redemption as a process of nature. 41 · 
Meanwhile, modern man's self-understanding has ovetster.,ped its 
bounds. It bas tripped over the husk of myth in the New Testament, and 
shown no concern for the real stumbling-b-lock, the kernel of the 
keryl!! which is in the New Testament. Por man's self-understa~ding 
has advanced to the idolatrous level of thinking of itself as 
.. 
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self-enclosed, self-subsistent. ("Modern man always makes use of 
technical means which are the result of science ••• Nobody reckons with 
direct intervention by ttanscendent pol'lers. 1142) But there still is · 
hope; at least the ideas of God 1 s transcendence and of evil are sig-
nif~cant in the modern ,«:>rld, if only paritially: 
'lbese mythological conceptions of heaven and hell are no longer 
acceptable for modern men since for scientific thinking· to speak 
of "above11 or "belo,f'' in the universe has lost all meaning, but 
the idea of the transcendence of God and of evil is still sig-
nificant.43 
lbe concern of the theologian who wants to make contact with modern 
man and the modern world must center upon the entry of a transcendent 
God. 
The only relevant question for the theologian is the ·basic 
assumption on which the adoption of a biological as of every 
other Weltansch•uung rests, and that assumption is the view of 
the 'l«>rld ,~1ich has been moulded by modern science and the 
modern conception of human nature as a· self-subsiste_nt unity 
Immune from the interference of supernatural powers.44 
God's entrance into the world is the stumbling-block over which 
modern man should fall, and not the cosmological and mythical features 
of the New Testament as they attempt to describe God's entrance into 
man's world rl existence. 
With this introduction to modern man, ,te get a prelude of 
Bultmann's demythologizing. We cannot forget that he has committed 
himself to speak of God only in terms of manis existence. His concern 
for demythologizing is a consequent of his existential interest rather 
than a preliminary for it. Por even before he begins his demythologi-
zing, we ~now that he will never speak of the transcendent God in • 
and of Himself. 
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In order to understand demythologizing, it is advisable for 
us to determine what Bultmann means by the woxd ''myth." It is not 
easy to perform such a task, for Bultmann has at least two meanings 
for the word myth. At one time he defines myth and ''mythological" as 
a view of the ~orld which uses imagerv "to express the other-worldly 
in terms of this world, and the divine in te~s of human life, the 
other side in terms of this- side.1145 'Ibis definition of myth·seems 
to be the one generally employed among scholars of ,«>rld religions, 
even in the study of the Old Testament. At another occasion, Bultmann 
refers to myth as a view ,fhich leaves room for extra and supermundane 
I 
interventions, in contrast to the ·modern world view "1hich postulates 
a closed system of cause and effect.46 ·'lbese two definitions are 
at variance. While the first defines myth in terms of its content, 
the second attempts the definition with the intention of myth as its 
primary consideration. The first definition is exemplified in Bultmann's 
delineation between ''myth" and "legend": myth refers to the central . 
Christian story of incarna.tion, atonement, resurrection, and exalta-
tion represented as a cosmic drama of redemption (this is the content 
of myth); legend is used to refer to peripheral stories and anecdotes 
~ch serve to illustrate aspec_ts of the central myth (that is, aspects 
of its content).47 Bultmann is prepared to retain myth if it is defin-
ed in the second method above; but he asserts that the purpose of myth_ 
in the New Testament (that is, its attempt to speak of the transcend-
ent God's intervention in human existence) has been impeded by the 
terms of the myth: ''The real purpose of myth is to speak of a transcen.;. 
dent ppwer which controls the world and man, but that purpose is 
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impeded and obscured by the terms in which it is expressed. 1148 
Bultmann -will not quarrel with the true intention of myth; he 
quarrels with myth when it attempts to picture the -,«>rld; 111he real 
purpose of myth is not to present an objective picture of the world 
as it is, but to express man's understanding· of himself in the world 
in which he lives. 1149 lbere is reason, then, for the charges ,fhich 
have been brought against Bultmann, suggesting that bis definition 
of myth is incoherent. Hepburn suggests that Bultmann's definition 
is wide enough to include all pi•ctorial, analogical, and symbolicai 
speech; H.P. Owen says that Bultmann has selected this term to desig-
nate a very heterogeneous colleciion of items in the New Testament, . . 
''meaningless elements," but items that are very unlike each other.SO 
. 
Lohmeyer argues that Bultmann's· definition of ''myth .. is too narrow; 
for myth revolves -around the wealth ,of .relations:·between God and the 
world no less than between God a.nd man, and in such a context, 
demythologizing is impossible.51 These_ charges of inconsistency in 
. 
Bultmann's definition of ''myth" stem from a failure to grasp Bultmann's 
differentiation between the outward form and content of myth, and the 
int~ntion of myth. 
1be ~:f:~11~~ to define ''myth" is for Bultmann an exercise in 
authentic language. Por he argues that there is a proper myth when 
its intention is to express man's understanding of himself in the 
M>rld in which he lives, just as there is an improper (unaut~entic~ 
myth when myth assumes as its purpose to present an objective pic-
ture of the world .as it is. Myth in its proper sense, then, is to 
be equated with the linguistic archetype of self-understanding •. · 
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My-th _ in_ its improper sense is the process of a ttributi~g to this 
. . 
archetype referents which are unauthentic, and therefore of a 
subject-object form. With these definitions at hand, we turn to the 
actual process of cle~ythologizing. 
It is apparent that Bultmann's process of demythologizing 
emerges -from his existential analysis. If it is assumed that all 
thought in the New Testament must serve self-understanding, then any 
other material will be myth in the improper sense; it is unnecessary 
He (Bultmann)' says explicitly that only the existential elements 
in the New Testament can be accepted4' Yet they are claimed. to . 
be the fulfilment of our natural ~elf-knowledge; it must be 
clear that they correspo·nd to a latent possibility. in the human 
Dasein. But ,,hy? Because, if-:one of .t_hese existential elements, 
revealed by the analysis of e~istential philosophy, fails to 
meet a human situation, then these existential elements in the 
New Testament must rightly be call~d ''mythical," an irruption 
of the divine into the human realm, which is inadmissible, it 
is a violent rupture-like that of a miracle-of the conditions 
of our· existence; then, fundamentally they themselves would no 
longer be existentia1.s2 
Por Bultmann, the process of demythologizing is less a method of 
depleting the text than it is a hermeneutical method. 
This method ofinterpretation of the New Testament which tries 
to recover the deeper meaning behind the mythological conceptions 
I call de-mythologizing-an unsatisf ac.tory 1«>rd, to be sure. 
Its aim is not to eliminate the mythological statements but to 
interpret them. It is a method of hermeneutics.53 
: ·.·.=.utilizing the view of language which so far has emerged from 
Bultmann's theology, we suggest that demythologizing is the process 
of·providing the archetype "self-understanding" with the maximmu 
number of lucidly authentic referents. For any concept ,mich fails 
to verify authentically this self-understanding can certainly not be 
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the Word of God: 
'!be touchstone of a Christian concept's authenticity will be its 
correspondence with .some existential structure of Dasein; any 
concept devoid of correspondence is certainly not the Word of 
God, not that \'lord which, since it calls upon man, can only 
concern in him what constitutes him existentially.54 
In t«>rking with the Word of God, it is the purpose of the exegete to 
"discover whether the New Testament offers man an understanding of 
himself \•Jhich will challenge him to a genuine existential decision • .. ss 
!fllatever does not contribute to that challenge is not an authentic 
referent to the archetype "self-understanding, 11 and hence must be 
called unauthentic and valueless. Self-understanding,is authentically 
verified in the New Testament by belief in Christ, and this is proper 
myth; but belief in Christ "does not mean considering the miracle 
stories of the New Testament to be true, 1156 for that is improper 
myth, unauthentic reference, unnecessary baggage. 
Mythological language is not distasteful to Bultmann because it 
speaks of God obliquely; mythical statements are rejected because they 
are constructed so as'.1x>· have the grammatical and logical form of 
scientific statements, and as a consequence are open to scientific 
criticism. Instead of· preserving the "i.nfinite .qualitative difference" 
between God and:.the,10rld, myth so represents God that He seems to be 
one more item within the world.57 If' improper myth pictures God as 
quantitatively rather than qualitatively different from. the world, 
then a failure to demythologize is no less a sin than asserting 
unauthentic referents for the archetype "self-understanding." In 
essence, to demythologize is to carry on the same task as did Luther 
in the Reformation: 
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.Demythologizing is the radical application of the doctrine of 
justification by faith to the sphere of knowledge and thought. 
Like the doctrine of justification, demythologizing destroys 
every longing for security. There is no difference between 
security based on good ,,x,rks and security built on objectifying 
knowledge.SB 
Demythologizing provides us ,1i th a microscopic view of Bultmann's 
vi_ew of language. He does not aim to demythologize when myth is 
understood proper_ly as self-understanding expressing itself. Just 
as it is his purpose not to eliminate proper mythological statements, 
but to interpret them through a valid hermeneutics; so it is his pur-
pose not to eliminate the symbolic archetype "self-understanding," 
but to attribute to it authentic referents in the moment of decision. 
Just as he will retain in the process of demythologizing any statement 
which will throw light upon self-understanding (such as freedom, 
decision, forgetting the past); so also he ,dll retain as valuable 
,ri.thin his language those archetypes which, though subsumed to the 
major archetype of self-understanding, are contributory towards a 
more excellent self-understanding. 'lb.e parallelism between one 
aspect of Bultmann's vielf of language as it has thus far emerged 
(archetypes modified and validated by authentic referents) and his 
definition of a proper myth; and between the other aspect of his view 
of language (archetypes deprived of any possible meaning by unauthen-
tic referents, objective in form) ·and his definition of an improper 
myth as an attempt at describing the world objectively-this paral-
lelism is more than a mere co-incidence. For the proc_ess of demythol-
ogizing dem~nstrates t~at for him language can h~ve only the proper 
function of attributing authentic instead on unauthentic referents 
to the archetypal forms. 
29 
Demythologizing is carried on in order to reach that iford of the 
New ~stament which produces the greatest amount of self-understanding. 
lbe ~e.ryea is that element which P,rovides the maximum of 
self-understanding and self-realization- in man. As such it is coa-
posed of~ segments: self-understanding of one's past (with 
consequent judgment of the past), and self-realization for the future 
(through grace and revelation). In ·~.sss~eace, then, the language of 
kery;S!!! is taking the archetype "self-understanding" (discovered as 
one of the existentialia by existential analysis) and amplifying it 
two ways: it is eliminating the unauthentic referents; it is 
accomplishing this task by contrasting them with authentic referents. 
'lbe first is judgment in Bultmann's theology; the second is grace. 
n, the kerYP!! in these tl«> aspects we now turn. 
Utilizing the view of language wbi.ch has thus far emerged, we 
may s~gest that sin is the ascription of the unauthentic referents 
of self-subsistence, complete self-assertion, and unwillingness to 
surrender, to the symbolic archetype of self-understanding. Bultmann 
says that sin is··se1f-assertioa.S9 He calls sin "the claim of man 
to seek to exist in his own right, to be his own master, and to 
.take his life into his own hands.1160 Looking at sin in its relation 
to self-understanding, we note that Bultmann's conception of sin is 
really a lack of self-realization, just as salvation is ' .. , 
self-realization.61 Bultmann utilizes the existential term Angst 
to clarify .the crux:·of sin: "What is it, if sin is unresponsiveness 
towards the future? It is dread, the dread of the man who is unwil-
ling to surrender to what is a mystery to him ••• It is dread of God 
• and so revolt against God. n62 
... 
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It would be meaningless for Bultmann to describe the Pall as 
an objective fact of history; ~he Pall is actually sin in its 
durative aspect. "'!be only reasonable attitude for man to adopt 
apart from Christ is one of despair, to despair of the possibility 
of his ever achieving authentic Being.1163 lbis ls a basic definition 
of the Pall for Bultmann. Nonetheless, there is a difference between 
Bultmann's interpretation of the Pall and the approach of the pbilosa-
phy of existentialism. Malevez notes that although existential. 
analysis does not ignore the Pall, it does not appreciate its depth. 
Existentialism trusts that its knowledge of authentic existence 
brings with it the ability to accomplish this existence (so-called 
Socratic fallacy). But the New Testament argues that man ~annot 
attain such authentic existence, according to Bultmann, man bas lost 
all po\fer to do so. In fact, the New Testament blames man for 
insisting upon his ability to reach the authentic life; . what he needs 
to do is to surrender.64 'Dle surrender of the keryp.a is our next 
item of consideration. 
Grace and revelation are the two constitutive elements of the 
kerYS!!• 'lbe event, when viewed as grace, is conceived as bringing 
man to his authentic existence; when viewed as revelation, it is the 
impartation of some kind of knowledge or understanding.65 Prom the 
linguistic angle, when ~be event is viewed as grace, the archetype 
is authentic existence; when the event is viewed as: revelation or 
knowledge, the archetype is complete self-understanding and total 
self-realization. In any event, although the archetype "authentic 
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existence"· is i ·ntelligible to existential analysis, it remains to be 
seen whether or not man can attain such authentic existence by himself. 
Macquarrie remarks, 
Pallen man, just because he is still man, has an existential 
possibJlity of authenticity, but this may not be an existentiell 
possibility for any given individual in .a particular situation. 
It nay requir~ a gracious act from be6ond. hims~lf to make ·the possibility one th ich he can choose. 6 · 
Malevez notes that Bultmann is not without ,dtness _ in this 
matter. Por Bultmann asserts that while philosophy can becane aware 
of authentic nature, it cannot achieve the same. Malevez interprets 
Bultmann's thought as follows: 
Philosophy retains the conviction that once man becomes aware 
of his "authentic" nature, he will be able to r~alize it; in 
short, ·philosophy is convinced that it alone can disentangle 
the true being of man and thus set it free to make the act of 
surrender ••• Prom the New 'n!stament point of view an act of 
divine love alone can save us; indeed, it is not too much to 
say that the Christian message ·is not primarily ·a doctrine ·of 
the nature of our "authentic existence," but the proclamation 
of the saving act, the saving event, which is accomplished in 
Christ. 6-7 · · · · 
'Ibis is an essential difference between Bultmann and the philosophy 
of existential analysis. John Macquarrie summarizes Bultmann's 
differences ·with existentialism succinctly: 
Bultmann feels himself obliged to part company with the 
philosopher and to take a different path. He maintains that 
the fallen nature of man alienates him so radically from his 
authentic existence that tho.ugh he may conceive it, he cannot 
of himself attain it. Only an act of grace from beyond man 
himself can put the possibility of his true life within his 
grasp; and Bultmann, ~f course, claims·1·that·•Christian faith 
does kno,, of ·such a gracious act. This act lies beyond the 
horlzans·-: of"existential analysis. It is God's decisive act in 
Christ, as proclaimed in the kerygma.68 
Ittel spealcs of Bultmann's differences with the existentialists by 




hm Bultmann and Heldegger di~agree in interpreting this human factor: 
Wie bei He1degger, so zeigt auch bei Bultmann der Ruf die Schuld 
des Menschen auf. Nur ist eben der Unterscheid der, dass bei 
Heidegger der Mensch diese seine Schuld in Bntschlossenheit auf 
sich a.ebmen muss, da ihn seine radikale Bigenmlchtigkeit blind 
macht gegenllber der Tatsache, dass er seine Bxistenz als Geschenk 
betrachten kann. Dies aber tut der Mensch des Neuen Testamentes 
und erlangt ·. somi t Verge bung se'iner SUnde als Bef reiung wn 
seiner Bigenmlchtigkeit.69 
If it is true that Bultmann's man, as distinguished from the 
philosophers', does not have the grace to reach authentic existence 
in and of himself, then it will take a Word from God for such a pro-
cedure. ~n a real sense the kerygma, as God's gracious l'lord, attributes 
to the archetype "self-understanding" authentic referents which are 
the act of God. In spite of Bultmann's attempt to speak of all of 
theology in terms of man's existence, it appears that these •uthen-
ticating referents are human referents more to the degree that they 
. 
formulate a possibility for man than to the degree that they describe 
a pre-existent authentic referent ~n man's capacity and nature. 
\fllile Bultmann does not hesitate to speak of grace as the event 
~ich brings authentic existence, he_ prefe_rs to view the keryp~ as 
the encountering revelation which imparts complete self-understanding 
of the past and future within the present moment. 'Ibis is in keeping 
. with his announced intention of relating all theology to the 
· self-understanding of man. It is to the kerygma as it encounters 
. ·man's self-understanding with enlightening revelation that we now 
turn. 
Bultmann asserts that to become a Christian is to pass judgment 
on one's past, and·· to see the future as endless possibility: 'Dle 
man who becomes a Christian "experiences an encounter which presents 
him with the possibility of decision against his old self and in 
favor ·of his new sel.f'~ -He does experience this encounter in hearing 
the Word o( divine grace.~•70 The- revealing grace of the kerypa 
shows man that he is bound to himself. Authentic life and complete 
self-understanding will result only when man is delivered from himself. 
"It is the claim of the Ne" Testament that .1:&is .~:ls·.·exact.1-y· what: has 
happened. This is precisely the meaning of ,mat was wrought in 
Christ. 1171 Forgiveness of sins has a rather familiar and orthodox 
ring · when we hea-r Bultmann define it. as "simply the obliteration of 
man•·s past, and taking him to be what he is no~the man of the 
future; it means relieving him of dread and thereby making him free 
for the future.1172 But any hint at orthodoxy vanishes when he goes 
on to describe how the forgiveness of sins was accomplished. 'lbe 
cross, it is true, "has created a ne,v and permanent situation in 
history. 1173 But the cross is not the cross of the Creed. Por the 
cross really me11ns "to make the cross .our own, to undergo crucifixion 
,vith him. 1174 And the preaching of .the cross is. called the event of 
redemption: "'!be preaching of the cross as the event of redemption 
. . 
challenges a~l who hear i -t .to appropriate this significance for 
themselves, to be willing to be crucified with Chri~t.:7S Maleve• 
sUD111arizes Bultmann's teaching on the cross thus: "In the cross of 
Jesus, in some .way, within time, God achieved the liberating judpent 
which He passes ab aeterno upon our existence ••• '111e cross ••• lifts us 
to the plane of .authentic existenc~."~6 Man now has complete . . 
self-understanding in the moment. Man's understanding of existence 
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at that 1110ment, Bultmann reminds us, need not be conscious; neverthe-
less, it makes its effect known. "It permeates and controls imper.:. 
ceptibly all atL~iety and resolve, all the joy and dread, and is called 
in question at every encounter. 1177 
If we viel\f this segment of the kerygm.a from a linguistic angle, 
and attempt to visualize how the self-understanding which comes 
through the Word of the cross is rela_ted to Bultmann's view of language, 
we shall find some interesting developments. Por now the archetype 
"self-understanding" (or, viewed another way, "authentic existence•, 
has kerygmatic acts-of-God as authentic referents; included among 
these referents is man's deliverance from Himself through God's 
gracious act of the cross (through obliteration of man's past) for 
future freedom in which man is no longer conditioned by past decisions. 
In a real sense, then, God takes active part in attributing authentic 
re~erents gleaned from man's concrete situation to the archetype 
"self-understanding." Is it so odd that this process should be any-
thing other than God's "\'lord"? God's procedure in authenticating 
the existence of man is called an "act"; but the vehicle nearest the 
. 
act, which is selected to make these acts meaningful to man, is God's 
Word. The fact that Bultmann makes no differentiation between God's 
act in Christ, and the Word of that act preached today, demonstrates 
a metaphysical affinity between the action of God and language as it 
is viewed by Bultmann. The Word which speaks, and the action about 
which it speaks, are in$eparable; in fact, they are one and the same 
for Bultmann. We shall examine this aspect in greater detail shortly. 
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At present, we shall determine how Bultmann handles the ~esurrec-
tion in· his_ theology of the kerygma. "But .what of the ~e$i.-rrection? 
•• _.Obviously it is not an event of past history with self-evident . 
~aning. 11'-8 What thetti~.!the resur-r_ection? The story of the resurrec~ 
tion i _s the first ~tness -to _the power· of Christ's crucifixion ·tQ 
bestow authentic existence. -The resurrection, preached·. by the first 
apostles, was God's way of saying that the cross of Christ was the 
·empowering medium to ·authentic existence. Thus understood, the 
resurrection was not formally ·a part of the Chrlst-e.vent; neither was 
' • ! 
it one of the authentic referents, ' one of the acts of God. Rather_, 
.the -·resurrection as· preached was. witness to the validity of God• s 
proce·ss of attributing authentic referents to the ~rchetype "authentic 
. . . 
existence.'! ?he resurrect-ion,. ~s preached, was the vall~ating word 
for ali- that had happened .before, ~t. "The _faith ·of Baster is just 
this~faith in the· word of preacbing.1179. Malevez. ciears the air in 
descr_ibing the res_ui're~tion as _a ''mythical storyi• when he s11moarizes 
_Bultmann's.teaching of the ~esurrecti'on: 
. . . 
God created the belief in the Resurrec-tlon in the minds of the 
disciples ••• in the guise of a mythical story,· the true divine 
content .which God poured into their.hearts was, quite simply, 
the knowledge of the triumphant value of the .Cross, the discover0 of ·its. saving significance, the grasp of its liberating aspec·t. 8 
'Ibis discussion of the resurrection.as the first kerygmatic 
proc~amation·· leads us- into a consideration of proclamation within the 
moment as the ·very "•ct of God." Por if the cross of Christ, and all 
of _God's ·ac.ts as well, are understood linguis_tically .as God attributi~g 
authentic referents tQ the archetype "self-understanding," we may . 
c~nclude that.only an act of God can attribute authentic ·referents to· 
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such an archetype. If this is the case, then all proclamation will 
have to be an act of God; the kerypa will .be God acting. Por He 
alone can attribute the authentic referents. All preaching, if it 
is the act of God, will have as -".its ·purpose the actualization of the 
archetype "self-understanding.n For according to Bultmann, proclama-
tion does not communicate something that happened in a certain place 
-and at a certain time, "but rather says what has occurred to the 
person being addressed.·1181 If :·prea~hing is the actualization of 
self-understanding, as an act of God, "the preaching is itself 
revelation and does not merely speak about it, so that it mediates 
a content that one can understand or to which he can relate himself 
through knowledge and thereby 'have' the revelation.1182 
In addition, all preaching will be momentous and concretej that 
is, it will consider decisive possibilities within man in the concrete 
existential situation. God's active referents to the archetype 
"self-understanding" will confront me within my present situation. 
Existential timing is an important factor in making a "Word" relevant. 
For example, a word yesterday may have been meaningless until it 
becomes a decisive ,,iord for me now, in my presen·t situation. 83 Such 
a momentous proclamation can be consideredas:-.part and parcel of God's 
gracious revelational act of salvation: "As the preaching itself 
belongs to the fact of salvation, so also js·:this fact not what it is 
without preaching. 1184 
It is within the proclamation of the kerygma that man receives 
the full revelation of self-understanding. · It is within the proclamation 
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of the kerygma that man can see authentic existence. -And_ just as the 
existentialist philosophers claim to be able to address and question 
existence and thereby come into contact with being itself, so the 
momentous kerygmatic proclamation will enable Christian man to 
appropriate the proper authen~ic referents to the archetype_ "being 
itself." For the keryF! will bring to self-realization man's 
self-understanding as it is related to the transcendent, acting God, 
who speaks the Word. Bultmann's theology runs from the kerygmatic 
word, to Christology, to God J-Umself. Bultmann first associates 
Christ and the word of revelation in a concise manner: "Christ is 
revelation, and ••• revelation is the 1«>rd; for these t,.o are one and 
the same. 1185 Then Bultmann asserts that theology can only be 
sketched in terms of Christology.86 We ask why, and surmise the 
answer: Christ is God's meaningful l~rd spoken to man in terms 
that he can understand. Por that reason we are to construct a 
theology through Christology. In spite of himself, Bultmann agrees 
to discuss some of the "attributes" of God, never failing to relate 
them to man's existence in some way (and thereby abiding by his 
intention to arr-~ve at theology only through kerymatic Christology). 
Bultmann describes God's transcendence in terms nearly unacceptable 
to his own system of thought: 
God's transcendence is rathet" his constant futurity, his 
absolute freedom, which ••• excludes every laying hold on God by 
man, every constraining on or obligation on the part of God by 
the fulfillment of conditions which men can perform, every claim 
upon God ••• every rational comprehensibility of the divine action.87 
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In another ·place, he proceeds to describe God's transcendence in 
terms more palatable to one who would make all theology dependent 
~on man's existence. Por God's . transcendence is not that into ~ich 
the soul is absorbed as it soars above the world in devo·tion, _ abstrac-
tion and ecstasy. Rather, _His transcendence ·is apprehended by the 
believer as the "preservation of detachment in the actual concrete 
situations··.of: 1ife-a detachment ·which makes decisions:and actions of 
real import, because in it man thinks and acts as a free agent.i,88 
'lbe attribute of God's omnipote·nce -·: is taken seriously in the \i>rd 
of divine grace, which \'lord (kerzea). liberates man from himself. 
with po,.er.89 God's judgment is taken seriously in the Word of divine 
grace (His holiness), when man's finitude is seen "with all its logi-
cal implications as sin." It unmasks the "dignity of man as 
self-deception. ••90 God's eternity is taken seriously in the Word of 
God, for this is a Word of forgiveness. "As the man whom God has 
·forgiven ••• man is •in his real being, his existence is no longer a 
transient one ••• 'l'hat 18:sbo,m in the cessation of all self-glorification.1191 
Returning to our consideration of the kerygmatic proclamation,. 
it is well for us to note that th~ lerypa draws the past and the 
future into the ·eschatological present. For the kerypa is the 
"once-for-all eschatological event, which is continually re-enacted 
in the word of proclamation. 1192 In other \fl>rds 1 the apostolic preaching 
which originated in the event of Baster Day is itself a part of the 
eschatological event of redemption.93 It is apparent that Bultmann 
has collapsed the kerymatic act into the eschato1ogical present so as 
to retain his existential emphasis upo·n decision· in the moment. 
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Another important service rendered by contemporary kerygmatic 
proclamation is its bracketing function. Por Bultmann correlates 
its role with that of ''death" within existentialism. He asserts that 
in the system of existential analysis, the phenomenon of death serves 
the following p~poses: (A) death provides terms by which existential 
analysis can understand man in his totality; (B) death limits man from 
the outside (a ·°limitation which man himself is not capable of provid-
ing); (C) death prevents man from. idle speculation about "something 
outside of man"; (D) death constitutes man as a totality within his 
existence. Bultmann then goes on to state that theology "gives this 
function to the proclamation that is encountered in existence."94 
Ju$t as death within existential analysis clarifies the ontological 
s-tructur~, thereby adjusting the exi.stentialia, so now proclamation 
is given the task of adjusting these same existentialia in a range 
of value, demonstrating their inherent dependence upon self-understanding 
and authentic existence. Since our interest is Bultmann's view of 
language, we must ask the rhetorical question here: Does not preachi~g 
also adjust the archetypes of language in proclamation? Does it not · 
fit •the archetypes in their relation to the major ,rchetypes of 
self-understanding and authentic existence? Does it not simultaneously 
reject unauthent~~ _referents, and postulate·God-act referents? 
It is self-evident that.within Bultmann's system th~re can be 
no ·revelation of- God outside of the kerygma. for revelation is . ,: ·. 
actually God's attributing of authentic referents to the archetype 
of self-understanding. ~ith such a limited definition, Bultmann has 
delimited all revelation to the kerygma. For the ke~ygma accomplishes 
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what man in self-assertive sin did.-mt accomplish, although it was 
within the will of God when He created the ,mrld: 
:Man·1earns to understand himself in the light of the revela-
tion of redemption not a bit differently than he always already 
should understand-himself in the face of the revelation in 
creation and law-namely, as God's creature who is limited by 
·God and stands under God's claim ••• If the re,,elation in Jesus 
means salvation as an understanding of oneself in him, then the 
revelation in creation meant nothing other than. this understand-
ing of oneself in God in the knowledge of one's own creatureli-
ness.95 
Any talking "about" God that lies outside of the kerygma is merely 
the ascription of unauthentic referents to the archetypes of 
self-understanding and authentic existence; we recall that only these 
two (really one and the same) archetypes are able to burst forth into 
the light of being itself. Bultmann asserts that before ,1e can begin 
to discuss the validity of natural revelation, ,1e must arrive at the 
authenticity of the word "God. tt96 A Christian who believes solely 
in revelation through Christ cannot stand idly by while others assert 
that "God" manifests himself in ~atural revelation. "\'le must adhere 
to the view that the criterion for the critical investi~,;ation of any 
ltnowledge of God allege,tly g~ined elsewhere is the knowledge of God 
which belongs to the Christian faith. 1197 For the Christian, revela-
tion means recognizing his o,·m authenticity: 
The meaning of revelation consists in its being the means 
whereby~~ achieve our own authenticity, which we cannot 
achieve by our own resources. Therefore, to know about reve-
lation means to know about our own authenticity~ and at the 
same time, thereby to know our own limitation.98 
But it is precisely this limitation which those who espouse natural 
revelation will not admit. They have failed to perceive the things 
thnt can be kno\lm about God in their existence. Instead, Bultmann 
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argues that they have turned the "negatives" ·collected into positive 
statenients abnut the ontological God. 99 Is it incorrect for us to 
assert that the "negatives" which the supporters of natural revela-
tion transform \into positive statements about the ontological Goci are 
other than unauthentic referents to the archetype "authentic existence" 
summarized in objective statements? Such -"revelation" is thus unauthen-
tic langunge, just as it is also sin for Bultmann. 
!laving dealt with Bultmann's theology insofar as it concerns itself 
with presuppositions, existential analysis, :demythologizing, and the 
e~clusive kerygma, we shall turn to one final area of his theology in 
our attempt to discern what view of language emerges. ~\'e shall consider 
faith as it is immune from proof and disproof. Bultmann is concerned 
with removing faith from the sphere of objective knowledge. He asserts 
that ."it is precisely its immunity from proof which secures the Christ-
ian proclamation from the charge of being mytholo.gica111 ·. (in the imprope~ 
sense).100 He remembers vividly those ~imes in the Church's history 
when faith was shattered because it had been improperly based upon the 
tenets of a fluctuating knowledge of science. Faith needs to be emanci-
pated from its association with a l«>rld of objective terms.101 If the 
acts of God are not susceptible to the justifiable criticisms of 
science,102 then faith too must lie beyond their rea~h.103 
B:ultmann's definit.ieli of faith is interested primarily -in the 
future. "This is what is meant by 'faith': to open ourselves to the 
future ••• turning our backs on self and abandoning all security ••• 
surrendering all our self-confidence. nl04 . Belief is response t~ that 
gift of God in which all of the future is bestowed upon man in 
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anticipation, and the acceptance of which makes man free again to accept 
any destiny: "Belief mea_ns, as the anticipation of every possible. future, 
that -taking of man out of the world, and his ingrafting into eschato-
logical existence. •~105 If faith is such an eschatological ingrafting, 
it is not a quality which inheres in a believer, but rather a possibility 
that must constant~y be laid hold of anew-as this is the only way that 
man exists.106 
The repeated proclamations of the kerygma necessary to nurture 
faith preserve it from falling into the sphere of objective knowledge. 
Faith cannot be proven. When it is spoken about, the kerygma itself 
is spoken and ·proclaimed. Just as tile historian Bultmann can "only 
discover various instances of faith in revelation, never (instances) 
of the revelation itself, 11107 so also the theologian Bultmann is never 
able to discover in the present moment faith in and of itself, but 
only the revelation of the keryea. Faith, then, is inseparable from 
the kerygma that gives it life. It is momentous, and its concern·: for 
possibilities in the future flo11JS from its decisive authenticity in 
the present. It is beyond proof, for it deals with a God who is Quali-
tatively different from the objective l\lOrld. Paith is self-understanding 
with the authentic referents "possible future of freedom" and "oblitera-
tion of past sins" attributed to it. 
CIIAP'mR III . 
BUL'JMANN' S VIBW OP 'DIBOLOG[CAL LAN(IJAGB 
Language as a Process of Authentic Bxistence 
In this chapter we propose to tie together those aspects of 
lansuage which have coae to the fore in our canalderation of Bultlllann•a 
theology. We shall first examine the constructs of a view of language 
which have emerged from bis theology. 'lben we shall formulate a 
working definition of language as it can be described for Bultmann. 
Pinally, we shall exb.ibi t his view of language as evidenced in a 
sermon preached in 1943. 
Bultmann's view of language must be filtered froa hie theology. 
Por he provides us with no clear and concise statements•• to llbat 
language is, or how it works, or where it connects with theology. 
In our theological consideration above, we discussed the undergirding 
assumptions of his thought; we attempted to catch the spirit of 
existential analysis, both in its existentlale and exlstentiell 
moments; we have seen the process of demythologizing as a sequential 
aspect of Bultmann's theology; we have characterized the kerypatic 
proclamation as God's act of affirmins man's existence in true 
authenticity. All through the investigation we caught glimpses of 
an emerging view of language and the presuppositions which undergird 
it. How we shall isolate those presuppositions of Bultmann's view 
of language. '1'hese assumptions need to be considered when tbe time 
comes to formulate Bultmann's view of language. 'lbere are six basic 
assumptions. 
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l'he first assumption for Bultmann's view of language derives 
from one of his basic theological assumption. Only that is meaning-
ful (linguistically) which increases self-understanding. If the 
bedrock of B~ltmann•s theology is the assumption that all theo-
logical endeavor is carried on in terms of man•s existence (i.e. 
self-understanding), then this basic assumption must be considered 
as a correlative aspect of his view of language. Bvery linguistic 
expression (theological) will aid, in some way or another, man's 
self-urderstanding. 'lbis assumption already alerts us to the usage 
of the archetypes suggested in existential analysis, and the authen-
tic referen~s as well. 
'lbe second assumption deals with the process of existential 
analysis. If existential analysis is granted the privilege of 
determining the existentialia which are to be actualized in the 
existentiell moment, then any theory of language will take into 
consideration this same existential analysis, as ·:well as the results 
it provides. It is safe to assert that the process of existential 
analysis provides "neutral" archetypes of a symbolic nature. All 
meaningful language will be connected in some -way or another with 
these archetypes and with their referents. 
In considering the third major assumption of Bultmann's view 
of language as it issues from his theology, it is necessary for us 
to recognize again the affiliation of Bultmann and Heidegger. '!be 
proximity of their approach to language should not be overlooked. 




to utilize what Heidegger has provided as suggestive of Bultmann's 
approach. Macquarrie notes that Heidegger's view of language is 
set aside by the modern logical positivists. In describing their 
rejection, he gives us a glimpse of Heidegger's view of language, 
especially his view of the origin of language: 
Certainly there is little tendency to accept Heidegger's view 
that language is to be understood primarily in terms of man as 
the bei-ng who has the existential possibility of discourse ••• 
Yet there are other kinds of language in which man expresses 
himself-and religious language is surely among them--where 
the relation between what is said ard the person Who says it 
is so close that any linguistic analysis would need to be 
correlated with an existential analysis.1 
Bultmann approximates such a position himself when he says, "Language 
is a mirror of the mode of thinking. 112 Language is not from the 
"thinking subject." but from the mode of thinking. Language results 
from tbe self's involvement with the world and with other selves. 
Th speak precisely, our third assumption is that language must be 
an act of authentic existence in Bultmann's thought, if it is to be 
meaningful. Language must at least pattern itself after tbe whole 
·terygmatic process, the process which brings self-understanding and 
authentic existence to realization. 
It is not improper to draw a parallel between Bultmann's hermeneu-
tics and his theory of language in this consideration. His henaeneutics 
suggest that the question of Goel and the question of myself are identi-
cal. This is the "receptive" side of theology. On the "expressive" 
side, language about God and language about myself are also identical. 
Any language of the "expressive" type arises from. within the authentic 
existence which it attempts to portray. Por Bultmann, there is one 
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basic presupposition underlying all interpretation: "'lhe presupposition 
for umerstandlag is the interpreter's relationsbip in bis life to the 
subject which ls directly or indirectly expressed in the text."3 
Surely this principle of interpretation must underlie any attempt at 
the symbolic interpretation of authentic existence as one seeks to 
portray it. Language is an act of authentic existence, just as 
interpretation depends upon the authentic relation one has with the 
subject he is attempting to interpret. 
Q>nnected with the assumption that language finds its origin 
in authentic existence is a consideration of the function of language. 
Language can never serve the subject-object function of formulation 
for Bultmann if it is to remain meaningful. Speech will never be for 
speech's sake. If it is authentic language, it will be kerygmatic, 
and hence a form of s1.a11ons. In considering the intention of theologi-
cal statements for Bultmann, Ogden submits that their function "is to 
present a certain possibility for understanding hU1118n existence, and 
directly or indirectly to SlBIIIDOD their hearers to realize this 
possibillty.114 
Noting the prominence which the terypa plays in Bultmann's 
theology, we do not overstate the case in asserting the .fourth 
assumption to be that the kerIP!! serves as primary example of 
meaningful language. Our analysis of the kerye, insofar as it is 
God's act proclaimed and God's act in proclaiming, will hold us in 
aood stead when it comes to evaluating theological discourse. Por 
it will provide us with a measuring stick. 
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'lbe fifth assumption deals with the role of demythologizing in 
Bultmann's view of language. Demythologizing plays only a subsequent 
role in Bultmann's view of language, just as it has in his theology. 
Demythologizing cannot serve as anything other than an example of 
meaningless language in the process of receiving meaning. Once again 
it would be well for us to notice the simil~rity between Heidegger 
and Bultmann. lars\en Harries bas analyzed Heidegger's usage of 
language as follows: Heidegger attempts to diminish the danger of 
seeing Sein as another Seinedes by using a language which is devoid 
of pictures. flor pictures belong to the realm of finite objects and 
can block our vision of the ontological. But finally, such an attempt 
cannot prove satisfactory. If we strive to reach Bei.ng, we ■ust find 
a language which is able to single out its own inadequac,~-5 It is 
apparent that Bultmann has followed nearly the same process in his 
demythologizing. In his grasp for being, be bas be·gun with a language 
which he thinks is able to point out its own inadequacy, the language 
of existential analysis. Starting from that point, he has proceeded 
to subract those pictures of Rew Testament language which, to his 
eye, describe Sein as another Seinedes. But the important factor to 
be noted is that Bultmann begins first with the language of being as 
the proper expression of trut~; from there be proceeds to demythologize. 
In bis view of language, demythologizing follows, but does not give 
genesis to, man's symbolic expression of encounter with being. 
lbe sixth assumption deals with Bultmann's disapproval of any 
subject-object ·formulations. He terms such subject-object formula-
tions "meaningless. 11 The sixth assuaJJtion is that an objective 
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formulation, linguistically, is nothing less than the positing of 
unauthentic referents. Such unauthentic referents conceal the real 
nature of Sein because they objectivize it. 1b objectivize is to 
place one among many; this is the same process as positing unauthen-
tic referents for an archetype, thereby objectivizing it and removing 
it from the sphere of authentic existence. Heidegger calls language 
"der Gllter Geflbrlicbstes" for precisely the same reason.6 
With these assumptions in mind, it now becomes our privilege to 
formulate concisely the view of language which has issued from our 
consideration of Bultmann's theology. Por Bultmann, language is 
the "momentous" process of providing the symbolic archetypes with . 
authentic referents. We shall discuss this statement in some detail, 
and then turn our attention upon language in the operation of a sermon. 
Our definition has suggested that language is a "momentous" 
process. It is momentous because language cannot be uttered by a 
thinking subject. Por Bultmann, language arises out of the momentary 
decisions of concrete existence, in the relations one has with other 
persons. Por if language is an act of authentic existence, it must 
arise in the moment. At the same time, language is a process, or 
better still, an "act." It appears to be an act patterned after the 
act of God manifest in the kerygma. Just as the act of Q>d has pro-
vided, within the keryl!!,, authentic referents for the archetypal 
existeatiale *'self-understanding," so also language is an act involv-
ing archetypes ard refe~ents. Language appears to take on the character-
istics of terzpa whenever it is authentic language. 
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'lbe "symbolic archetypes" mentioned in our definition are those 
which have been provided by existential analysis. 'lbese archetypes 
are symbolic representatives of the existentiali-a. They are man's 
method of symbolizing existence and being. The symbolic archetypes 
furnished by analysis are either neutral in regards to existence; or 
they are modified by unauthentic referents (and thus unauthentic 
themselves); or they are modified by some, but not enough, authentic 
referents (for the kerygma alone, and not existential analysis, can 
provide all the necessary authentic referents). we must now consider 
what is meant by "authentic" and "unauthentic" archetypes in greater 
detail. 
Authentic archetypes are those symbolized existentialia imich 
have enough .. authentic referents, even without the kerygma, to bave 
an air of authenticity, of being-witbin-e.xistence, about them. 
We recall Bultmann's admission that existential analysis is able to 
grasp the possibility of true authenticity even apart from the kerypa. 
Disregarding for the moment a consideration of the authentic referents 
which Bultmann would admit outside of the t.erre (such as might be 
found in authentic, though somewhat incomplete, existentialism), let 
us consider the authentic referents of the ker;rpa as they modify or 
validate the archetype "authentic existence." 'ftlese authentic refer-
ents of such an authentic archetype fall into t'WO categories divisible 
only for analysis, and not in existence itself. Where there is one 
type, there will automatically be the other. While in essence (or 
shall we say existence?) there is only one type of authentic referent, 
namely any human,_ personal, concrete decision (made through God's 
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gracious action) by which a man decides for the future in the present 
while forgetting the past, in our analysis of this authentic referent 
we can differentiate and find two categories: (1) An authentic refer-
ent is an act of God authenticating the archetype "self-understanding'' 
(here referring to the Cross); (2) an authentic referent is any other 
personal, momentous, decisive act whereby man is able to forget his 
past and decide for the future in freedom. 
Authentic ar:cbet.ypes, however, can become_ mutilated. "Unauthentic" 
archetypes are those which have been mutated from authentic by the 
attachment of unauthentic referents. Por example, we recall Bultmann's 
reference to the archetype ''being" or "Cbd•" Jlor those who think that 
there is such a thing as natural revelation apart from the terygma, 
this archetype is actually aa unauthentic archetype in that it does 
not convey any meaning for the understanding of existence and Being 
Itself. Thus, "God" objectivized has been transformed into an unauthen-
tic archetype, although it is still an archetyoe of sorts. Such an 
unauthentic archetype can be re-transformed into an authentic arche-
type through the proper attachment of authentic referents, that is, 
1be unauthentic referents which transform authentic into unauthen-
tic archetypes are closely related to the objectivizing process which 
Bultmann depricates so vehemently. Por it appears that unauthentic 
referents are formulations of the rational mind which attempt to give 
meaning to the archetypes of man•s existence by postulating objective 
referents connected only logically to these archetypes (that is, by 
a superficial division into subject-object), thereby assuming to give 
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meaning to those archetypes even when no self-understanding bas 
resulted. Unauthentic referents:· are modifiers which amplify the 
existential archetypes as if they were part of the objective worlcl 
around man rather than constitutive of man. Unauthentic referents 
treat man as an object; they deal with the existentialla as if they 
were part of the logical, natural, closed world of science. As a 
result, the symbolic archetypes of such existentialia are mutated 
into unauthentic archetypes by the process of receiving unauthentic 
referents as attributes. 
As a final consideratioa in our formulation of Bultmann's view 
of language, we give thought to the place of the kerygma. Is the 
kerte! merely an example? Is the kerygma the only expression of true 
and meaningful ~•nguage as this view of language has emerged from his 
theoiogy? We have seen that the kerypa has proved itself a clear 
manifestation of Bultmann's view of language. Now it remains for us 
to determine if the kerye is the only such theologically meaning-
ful language. Insofar as some factors of existential analysis contri-
bute to the self-understanding and authentic existence of man, there 
is truly ''meaningful" language apart from. the terygma. On the other 
hand, Bultmann carefully postulates that only through tbe kerYP!, 
that is thmugh proclamation (which is really God's act), is man 
enabled to reach the pure self-realization and self-understanding 
which may be called complete "authentic existence." In this sense, 
then, it would not be presumptuous to arpe · tbat .·for Bultmann only 
the keriea, only the act of proclamation, is _authentic and meaaiilg-
f ul language, theological language in the 1110s t precise sense. Por 
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the teryea:. entails the unmasking of the unauthentic referents of 
distorted archetypes just as it entails the ascription of authentic 
referents to these same archetypes. Proclamation is the very act of 
God carrying out this process. In sm, Bultmann's definition of the 
kerypa is sufficiently encompassing to include all of the language 
which is uttered in authentic self-understanding. Without reserva-
tion we can assert that for Bultmann the kerzpa is the most excellent 
example, and the only instance, of authentic language. Such an 
assertion is tempered by Bultmann's escbatological outlook in which 
every proclamation of the WOrd of God is at one and the same time 
the past, the present, and the future rolled up into one Word. 
While one could not expect ever,··aspect of Bultmann's view of 
language to be demonstrable from a single literary piece, we might 
well expect one of bl• sermons. to exemplify at least the major compon-
ents of this view. We tum now to a sermon preached May 30, 1943, 
with John 16:22-33 as the text. The sermon is recorded in 1bis \forld 
and Be:zo~.7 Appendix A of this paper contains an annotated outline 
of the sermon. In tbe following summary, we shall select specifics 
from that sermon which demonstrate Bultmann's view of language as 
it has been outlined above. we shall make reference to the specific 
archetypes therein contained; to the referents, both authentic and 
unauthentic; and to the overall process of thought which Bultmann 
follows as it sheds light on his view of language. 
Bultmann's concern in the sermon is communication with God 
through prayer. lhe existentiale form in question.is existence, 
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the possibility of relation to being. Bxistence com.es only through 
self-understanding in the concrete, or, in the words of the sermon, 
-only when "all oppressive problems are solved and there is only pure 
joy." Bultmann is prepared to provide authentic referents for this 
symbolic archetype, "&elf-understanding," or pure joy. He does so 
by replacing the unauthentic referents "threatened by the wrld,'' 
"temporal," "has objects" (whose archetype is actually an unauthentic 
one of supposed joy, created by objectivizing self-understalding 
into essence within the world), with authentic referents. Self-
understanding within the concrete situation sees beyond itself (~lies 
beyond the world"), has no fear of extinction ("no threat of removal"), 
does ·not objectivize anything, reaches a point of self-realization 
and self-explanation, and creates itself through freedom. 
Bultmann has progressed to the point of discussing freedom as 
it relates to self-understanding. The archetype symbolized by the 
word "freedom" is undoubtedly "the decision for existence in the 
moment." While it is not necessary to enumerate all the authentic 
referents here (see Appendix), or the unauthentic referents as they are 
displaced (which unauthentic referents have unauthentic ·"anxiety" 
as an archetype), one shuuld note especially the first authentic 
referent, "freedom from ourselves." 'nlis referent connects its 
archetype to the one above, "self-understanding." In addition, one 
should note the last referent of the section, the fact that such 
freedom ••comes only from being alone in the presence of God." 'lhis 
referent, in turn, becomes the new archetype. While in existential 
analysis this new archetype symbolizes death, Bultmann has ascribed 
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the function of the death-archetype, together with anxiety, to the 
archetype of proclamation, or encounter with God, or terrea.8 
So now we are concerned with referents which provide the authentic 
verification for the archetyDe 11enco11t1ter," or proclamation. Pirst 
we note that the unauthentic referents include "clinging to something," 
"covered by rags," "trying to hide." These referents provide unauthen-
tic modification of the unauthentic archetype "G6d" when this archetype 
synbolizes the God wbo bas been separated from existent man through 
objective, rational processes. 'lbe most decisive authentic referent 
for this archetype, "encounter," is Bultmann's satement, "possible 
only through the cross." One of the authentic referents, "understand-
ing ourselves," seems to be almost tautologous with the archetype 
it modifies. lbe two referents "confronted by God alone" and 
"understanding ourselves" are actually one. Here Bultmann reaches 
the kerrea. God 1s act of attributing referents is at the same t!me 
both an act of linguistic process (hence called ''proclamation") 
and also God's performing what is spoken in the proclamation: encounter-
ing man to bring him total self-understanding. Hence, the ker>'B!!! 
is sui generis. It can be called God's "act" on two accounts: 
Q>d acts in man's realm to attribute to man•s self-understanding those 
referents Which are fitting; God acts in His own realm to accomplish 
the archetype in the very process of attributing authentic referents 
to it (that is, by confronting man). These two are always inseparable. 
It is equally interesting to note how Bultmann sweeps away the unauthentic 
referents of the archetype ''encounter." 'Die unauthentic referents he 
attributes to the unauthentic archetype "anxiety," which, if 
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authenticated, will incorporate the judgmental aspect of the kerygma. 
'lbe final referent of consequence for the archetype "encounter" is 
"proved in the openness to enco·unters of life." 'Dlis ls the arche-
type "concrete moment." Actual · proclamation can occur only in 
openness to encounters of life, in the moment. We note that the 
authentic referents attributed to this archetype are, at least 
formally, tautologous with it. However, they are more than tautolo-
gies; they are authentic referents enlightening the self-uaderstandi~ 
in the moment by attributing to the moment characteristics descriptive 
of authentic existence. 
Bultmann has run his course in this sermon. He began by saying 
that true existence (prayer, relation to being),is possible only when 
all oppressive problems are solved• When there is complete 
self-understanding in the concrete. He proceeded to proclaim 
that such self-understanding is possible only by freedom, by decision 
for existence; this decision comes from being in the presence of God 
(through the kerygma) in the cross. Such cross-confrontation arises 
in the openness to encounters of life. Once again we are back at 
the theme of self-understanding in the concrete. 
In this sermon Bultmann bas demonstrated theological language 
in use. Prom within his own authentic existence we have followed 
him-in the concrete moment of the sermon-attributi·ng authentic 
referents to archetypes, thereby displacing the unauthentic referents. 
His sermon is nothing more nor less than the process of attributing 
authentic referents to the basic archetype "self-understaming." 
His sermon is pure kerygma. It is an act of God, Just as it is God 
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acting immediately upon the hearers. God unites the authentic 
referents and the archetype; only He can do that. Wilen one proclaills 
the kerypa, God deigns to accomplish His action through that person. 
Just as Bultmann bas been involved in proclamation of the kerygma, 
in putting into linguistic expression the Word of everlasting being, 
be has been engaged in the ''momentous" process of providing the 
symbolic archetypes of existence with authentic referents, concurrent-
ly displacing unauthentic referents and unauthentic archetypes. The 
sermon is kerypa. As kerypa, it exemplifies, demonstrates, and 
incorporates all of the meaningful language that can be spoken by 
man "about" God. 
In this chapter we have concerned ourselves with formulating 
precisely the view of language which is Bultmann's. We have enmnerated 
those basic presuppositions which issue from his theology and affect 
his view of language. We have characterized his view of language as 
the "momentous" process of providing the symbolic archetypes (of 
existence) with authentic referents. We have exemplified this view 
of language with reference to one of his senaons. In an attempt to 
remain as objective as possible, we have withheld any evaluation until 
the final chapter. There we shall have the opportunity to evaluate, 
appreciatively and critically, Bultmann's view of langunge and the 
theology from which it stems. 
CHAP'DDl IV 
APPRBCIATION AND CRITIQUB OP 'DIBOI.OGY AND VIBW OP LANGUAGB 
'lheology and View of Language Investigated from Within and Without 
It is now our privilege to express appreciation of the work of 
Rudolf Bultmann in theology and language, and .to analyze critically 
his system of thought and its emergent language-view both from within 
and from without. Since it has been demonstrated above that Bultmann's 
view of language issues unmistakenly from his theology, we cannot 
concern ourselves only with bis view of language. On the other hand, 
neither can our concern rest only with his theology. In this chapter 
we shall approve those aspects of his theology and language-view Which 
are valuable, and bring to light those aspects of both theology and 
language which appear to be untenable. After acknowledging the valu-
able factors, we shall turn our attention to difficulties encountered 
within the system itself. 'lben we shall question the system from 
without. 
. 
Christians find little difficulty in appreciating Bultmann's 
emphasis upon preaching the Word of God. In this day and age, with 
words tumbling upon men in a continuous barrage, it is necessary for 
the Word to enter men's bearing. 'lhe impo~tance of preaching is 
assumed in Bultmann's theology and language-view as well, and he has 
made a valuable contribution in emphasizing the importance of preach-· 
ing. Scripture bas not hesitated to speak of the Christ as God's last 
Word to men.1 'lbroughout the Old Testament too we find a constan~ 
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emphasis upon the piercing Word as it comes into men's hearts through 
their ears. Por preaching has alwaya been an essential part of the 
Church's mission. St. Paul refuses to separate the reconciliation 
of airist from the minister who preaches that reconciliation.2 'lbe 
Lutheran Confessions unhesitatingly make preaching of the Gospel one 
of the marks of the Church: 
Ba wird auch gelehret, dass alle Zeit musse ein heilige 
christliche ICirche sein und bleiben, -welche ist die Versamm-
lung aller Glaubigen, bei welchen das Bvangelium rein ge-
predigt und die heiligen Sakrament lauts des Bvangelii 
gereicht werden.3 
'11lere is little doubt in the minds of evangelical catholic Christians 
that preaching is no less important in the modern world than it has 
been in the past ages of the Church. 
Bultmann also suggests correctly that preaching ls to be done 
with meaning. That is the preacher's task week after week. Merely 
to repeat 1101.'ds is not to give accurate denotation to them. One wald 
never preach a German serman to an Baglish congregation. In like 
manner, the task of preaching to modern man is difficult; Bultmann 
has alerted the Church to the problem of preaching with meaning, and 
attempted to deal with it as ~11. We must credit him with endeawr-
ing to reach man where he is today with a message much too deep for 
bis activiatic life. Bultmann, as a chaplain, confronted troops in 
the trenches of the first World Wari preachers confront men in the 
pews of modern churches week after week. But their task is one and 
the same: to preach with meaning. To preach with meaning, at least 
two req~irements must be filled: the preacher must understand the 
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message to be preached in all of its ramifications; in addition, 
the preacher must be well enough acquainted with the hearer's world 
to relate the message to it. Bultmann has attempted to meet both 
of these qualifications. 
Preaching with meaning entails confronting the hearer with the 
person of Jesus Qirist-. In this respect Sul tmann is to be commended 
for emphasizing the importance of the personal encounter of faith. 
Cahill notes that Bultmann's stress on intersubjectivity "makes clear 
that there are areas of religious truth which are grasped and under-
stood only through personal living, personal conviction, the entire 
moral and intellectual being of the subject."4 In a similar spirit, 
the Lutheran Confessions are not slow to condemn the suggestion that 
the objective knowledge of facts comprises the totality of faith: 
Bs geschicht auch Unterricbt, dass man hie nicht von solchen 
Glauben redet, den •uch die Teufel und Gottlosen haben, die 
auch ~ie Historien glauben, dass Christus gelitten hab und 
auferstanden sei von Toten, sander man redet von wah~em Glauben, 
der da glaubet, dass wir durch Christum Goad und Vergebung der 
Sunde erlangen. Und der nu wiss, dass er ein gilldigen Gott 
durcb Christ1.1111 hat, kennet also Gott, rufet ihn an und ist 
nicht oho Gott wie die Heiden. Dann Teufel und Gottlosen 
glauben diesen Artikel, Vergebung der Sunde, nicht; darum 
seind sie Gott feind, konnen ihne nicht anrufen, nichts Guts 
von ihme hoffen.5 
We can appreciate Bultmann's concern for confrontation as part of 
the task of meaningful preaching. Just as it is the task of the modern 
preacher to make his speech meaningful to men, so it is his task to 
answer the request of bis hearers when they plead, "We -,uld see Jesus." 
1bere are otber aspects of Bultmann's thought which are wrthy 
of commendation, but we proceed with an analysis of his thought criti-
cally evaluated at once. While later ,fe shall examine his position 
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over and against other theologies, we first take him to task within 
his own frame of thought. Having understood bis theology and his 
language-view as best we can, we are now in a position to ask him 
questions from within bis own frame of reference. While it will not 
always be possible to evaluate completely the ramifications which 
adjustments in bis theology effect upon his language-view, it is to 
be underst·ood that we approach bis theology from a critical angle 
solely to demonstrate the weaknesses in the view of language which 
has emerged fr0111 it. 
1be first difficulty within the system of thought is ·that 
Bultmann's presuppositions are unsupr,orted. Some might assert that 
presuppositions are assumptions, and they need not be examined. 
Others might argue that examining the presuppositions of a system 
is a simultaneous·comparison of one system to another. On the other 
hand, presuppositions within a system dare never go unexamined~ even 
within the system they serve. It is part of critical thinking to 
examine one's presuppositions from within the structure built upon 
them in order to determine (1) whether the system follows conclusively 
from the assumptions; (2) whether all of the stated assumptions are 
necessary; (3) whether any assumptions are contradictory; (4) whether 
there are other ass1.111ptions which have emerged unnoticed, and have 
not been recognized as prior assumptions. 
'lhere is one basic assumption which runs throughout Bultmann's 
thought, but is neither expressed nor defended as such. Bultmann does 
not demonstrate ~by man ought to strive to become an authentic being 
in the first place. That is a not to be asked. Nevertheless, it is 
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this basic assumption·whicb underlies the whole of his thought, 
even though it is unexpressed. Since Bultmann refuses either to 
recognize it as an assumption, or to defend it as such (to do so 
would take him squarely into the forbidden realm of metaphysics), 
his entire system immediately assumes the air of persuasion as we 
shall note later. 
A second difficulty encountered in consideration of the assump-
tions is the rather imprecise formulation o"f the assumption dealing 
with modern man and the modern world. It is true that Bultmann's 
concept of revelation suits the modern personalistic, subjective 
climate.6 And yet, the charge has been leveled, and not without 
validity, that,:BuJ.tmann•s assumptions about the modern scientific 
world are imprecise and dated. Nalevez agrees with Jaspers when 
Jaspers complains, 
Bverytbing suggests that, like most of the rest of us, be 
(Bultmann) either ignores or does not understand its (science's) 
fundamental statements. If there is something of which·we can 
be quite certain, for us all, it is this, that in the form 
which it has assumed during recent decades, science has given 
up the attempt to make any picture of the world at all, because 
it knows that such a picture cannot possibly be created.? 
Macquarrie becomes more specific when he charges Bultmann with speak-
ing about the 1110dern world picture (the totality of what we have 
learned from science) when he means to speak of tbe average 
self-understanding of modern man (which is· not scientific, is 
secular, and takes man as the ultimate). In the same account, 
Macquarrie recalls an occasion when he reminded Bultmann of the 
fact that thousands of people go to Lourdes every year, and there 
seemed to be nothing inacceptable in this practice to many modern 
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minds. Bultmann's six wrds in reply spoke a volume: "But these 
are not modern men."8 Macquarrie goes on to suggest that Bultmann 
has made concessions to the modern man's self-understanding, mt 
always to the benefit of the kerypa; such concessions arose in bis 
confusion of the conception of modernity: 
Butlmann's own position is needlessly ambiguous. In some 
passages he makes concessions to the modern secularized 
self-understanding as well as to the modern world-picture. 
His position would have been greatly strengthened if he had 
shown less deference to modernity and criticized its assump-
tions more thoroughly. The concessions which he makes do not 
represent (p. 240) his own typical 'View, which bolds firmly 
to the kerypa, but arises from the confusions in his con-
ception of modernity.9 
If the above statements are true, then Bultmann has failed to 
be Sp! cif ic in his assuaption dealing with modern man. At one time 
be refers to the 1110dern M>rld as it is described by science.10 At 
other times be has in mind the closed tbought-'10rld of modern self-
unclerstanding, which will allow for no:.such an idea as a transcending 
power interfering with life.11 These two pictures of modernity are 
quite different, and are not to be lllixed together with verbal manipula-
tion. If his assumption about the modern world deals specifically with 
the scientific outlook prevalent in it, then he should be willing to 
admit with the scientists (as Jaspers sa,s) that science has give up 
any attempt to picture the wrld. On the other hand, if his assump-
tion about the incomprehensibility of the New Testament world to modern 
man is based upon a consideration of 1110dern man's self-umerstaming, 
then he should be more explicit about the makeup of this self -
understanding. and less anxious to condemn the myths of the New Testa-
ment as wholly unintelligible to modern man. Prom this brief 
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consideration it is apparent that Bultmann has homework to do in 
describing modernity. '111is basic assumption is beclouded with all 
manner of- side issues, and seems to be more a "catch-all" than a 
precise formulation of. "prior understanding. 11 
'lbe second major difficulty within the system does not deal 
specifically with presuppositl. ons, but with the system as developed 
upon the presuppositions. The difficulty lies in Bultmann's insistence 
that only the terypa can perform the act of self-realization for man, 
bestowing the grace to forget the past and face the possible future. 
Is the tervpa really necessary? Is it not tbe last remnant of the 
myth that Bultmann has set out to eliminate? While Bultmann has argued 
that the mythical view of the world must be accepted or rejected in 
its entirety,12 his usage of the word "demythologizing" points to the 
fact that he considers the primary language of religion to be myth.13 
It is not difficult to demonstrate that the kerypa fits into one of 
the definitions of myth which Bultmann has given. Is it necessary, 
then, to retain the kerypa? Bultmann has removed the actual signifi-
cance of Christ, and made His birth, death, and resurrection but a 
symbol within us. 
That a person was born, crucified, arose, if affirmed at all 
(and it certainly cannot be affirmed in the case of the resur-
rection), is affirmed only incidentally and as a possibility 
or ~robabilitI~ certainly not as a constitutive element of 
saving event. 
The question arises, if Christ is but a symbol (symbols are inter-
changeable and not exclusive), how could He be unique115 Bultmann 
answers this charge by saying that this is exactly the scandal of 
the act·ion of God perceived only by faith, where the foundation and 
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object of faith are one. This is an insufficient answer to so 
destructive a charge. Ogden has followed Bultmann's course through 
to the finish, and he demonstrates the truthfulness of the charge. 
He finds no room for the Bultmannian act of God.16 
Any system of theology which :ls as deeply indebted to philosophy 
as Bultmann's is to Heidegger's does indeed filld it difficult to 
sever itself from that system. Given the Heideggerian Dasein, it 
does not seem necessary to import the kerzea unless one has a prior 
disposition towards it and must make room for it. Por Bultmann has 
allowed that existential analysis is able to apprehend the existentiale 
"authentic existence" (and its symbolic archetype as well), but not 
attain it. Prom another point of view, he has empowered Dasein even 
to achieve authentic existence by the method in which he has ripped 
the ker;ypa from its historical foundation. Jac1111es Cuttat wastes 
no words when he argues that Bultmann's reduction of Christ's histori-
city-to a mere occasion for self-understanding is actually a mythical 
inner movement towards Christ, 
transforming into terms which are outwardly Christian a spiritual 
attitude which is ••• Hindu ••• He reduces the Christian message 
to a mere verbal and historical symbol, to a mirror which 
reflects rather than opens the way for our salvation. In other 
words, it is all a Christianized myth.17 
It is apparent that Bultmann's insistence upon the kerygma as tbe 
only gracious means to self-understanding and self-realization is an 
.. 
insistence born of cbgmatic compulsion, and not an attitude resulting 
from the fact that the kerypa is an integral unity in his existential 
analysis and theology. Since the kerygma is a loosely connected 
"Christianized myth," it too is vulnerable to the knife of demytbology. 
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Another difficulty within Bultmann's system is his unwillingness 
to carry on an exhaustive process of argumentation. At times 
Bultmann is unwilling to pursue inimical arguments which could 
prove to be just as valid as those Which he takes to be bis own, · 
though both co~ from tbe same initial stem. The sullen, almost mono-
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tonous rigidity of his language may be a symptom of such an unwilling-
ness to examine other arguments as possible avenues for thought. Speat-
i -ng of Bultmann's style of language, Jaspers says, 
He shrouds the splendours of the Bible with an enveloping layer 
of dry, objedtive language. His style is neither ponderous 
nor light, but conveys an atmosphere of sullen rigidity.18 
lbis style of prose demonstrates Bultmann's tendency to reject any 
argument not in consort with his own thought. His constant plea 
that he "does not understand•• may indicate something more than a 
difficulty in grasping symbols; it may indicate an unWillingness. 
Hepburn bas isolated specific cases in which Bultmann has proved him-
self unwilling to admit evidence that would be detrimental or disastrous 
to his position, even though such evidence proceeds fE0111 a line of argu-
ment which Bultmann himself at one time or another proposes to follow: 
1. The antinomies in the New Testament are construed so as to 
allow him to conclude, "Rise, therefore, above the mytho-
logical." Other conclusions are possible. 
2. Bultmann says that removal of Christianity from the sphere 
of myth upgrades it in value. Re goes on to argue that 
~emoval from the realm of proof must also raise it in value. 
But he has failed to argue for a valid proposition inimical 
to his position, namely, that the absence of evidence does 
not disqualify a religion from being acceptable by reasoned men. 
3. Absence of proof is commended by Bultmann; he argues that if 
faith were provable, it l«>uld reduce God to the status of one 
item among others in the -furniture of the universe, "aid only in 
that realm (are we) justified in demancli ng proof." This latter 
sentence begs the question. It assumes that we already know 
there are two realms; this tenet should surely appear as part of -the end product, not the initial presupposition of a theology. 
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Hepburn, an Bnglish empiricist, concludes with the suggestion that 
Bultmann's failure to admit evidence detrimental to his position, or 
even to examine such evidence willingly, is made more glaring by the 
fact that he will not support this as a crucial tenet, even though it 
is sucb.19 
Another charge which bas been leveled against the system of 
Bultma·nn deals specifically with the character of language which he 
employs. In our consideration of his view of language, we concluded 
that all theological language is for Bultmann kerypatic. As such, 
it has as its function the summonsing of man to authentic existence. 
All true theological language will have about it the air of persuasion. 
It is specifically this persuasive tenor.which proves to be a thorn 
for some critics. Bultmann bas been· .. classed with the existentialist 
thinkers, and he falls under the same linguistic criticism they do. 
The persuasive air of their language derives from the usage of meta-
phor and suggestion. While logical empiricists are charged with 
being content "to elaborate the subtleties of formal analysis ••• the 
existentialists, determined to grapple with the real problems, find 
no formal analysis that is adequate to the task. 'Ibey are constrained 
to quit the beaten track, to wallow in metaphor and suggestion." 20 
There is no room for "neutral" language either in existentialism or 
in Bultmann's theology. Perre' charges existentialists and existential 
theology with intentionally loading terms with evaluative assumptions: 
••1 hold, in brief• that many of the key utterances of existentialism may 
be recognized ••• as covert evaluation depending upon persuasive defini-
tions of crucial terms.1121 With persuasive definitions, the thinkers 
66 
set out to alter the name which is ordinarily used. Bxistence now 
can be either "authentic" or "unauthentic." Such a procedure makes 
the whole of Bultmann's language persuasive in tenor, and prohibits 
a concise evaluation of his language as language. Zuurdeeg's sugges-
tion that logical positivism will help the language of theology, as 
a language of conviction, by setting it off from the language of fact 
is perhaps a valuable suggestion.22 And yet, the problem of relating 
the language of convictional theology to the language of fact remains; 
when theologians like Bultmann refuse to speak a language of theology . 
which is meaningful to those who understand only the language of fact, 
the cause of the Gospel bas not &een advanced. A complete reliance 
upon persuasive language will in the end be viewed as the utterance of 
a spirit divorced from the aodern world, closed to the truths which 
the language of fact has to offer. Por persuasive language has the 
inherent possibility ofarerwhelming and overtaking the very truths 
about which it is persuaded. Tillich argues that religious symbols 
can never be viewed solely as symbols of persuasion, lest they become 
idols displacing the God who■ they were to serve: 
Religious symbols point symbolically to that which transcends 
all of them. But since, as symbols, they participate in that 
to which they point, they always have the tendency (in the 
human mild, of course) to replace that to which they are suppos-
ed to point, and to become ultimate in themselves. And in the 
moment in which they do this, they become idols.a3 
It is in this situation that theological language which is persuasive 
is apt to find itself. Such a situation presents a difficulty for 
Bultmann, a difficulty not easily overcome when one considers that 
his language-view is so intimately related to his theology. 
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The final factor with which we are concerned within BultmaM's 
system is his overzealous reference to God's "action," and with it, 
his embracing of the analogical method of tbeo•logical language. 
As noted earlier in the paper, Bultmann insists that theological 
statements must be concerned directly with human life. He reminds 
us, ~I am interpreting theological affiniations as assertions about 
human life. 1124 He is certain that if man speaks of God's action in 
tems of physical categories, or compared with natural force-even 
if His action. is not supposed to manifest its divine character in 
such an event-God's action will be understood in the categories 
of essence and will escape man in his existence.25 'Ibis assumption 
of Bultmann's brings with it a host of difficulties, not the least of 
which is a complete reljance upon the process of anaiogy in all 
theological language. All statements about God are analogical state-
men1S based on man-to-man relations. Bultmann unasbamedly aff i.rms 
the same when he says, "Such happenings between man and man are a 
pattern of what happens between Q>d and man. But what happens 
between man and man never embraces the whole of our existence."26 
Already the difficulty appears. Analogical statements made about 
God will be based entirely on what happens between man and man, even 
though such happenings ''never embrace(s) the whole of our existence.•• 
Qirist's birth, death, and resurrection can be referred to only insofar 
as they are analogous to acts of man in some way or another. 
By this assumption, B1:1ltaann is forced to speak of God in terms 
of man. That aspect of man which is most "real" or existential for 
him is man's decisive action, action in the present. So, be is content 
• 
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to speak of "God's act"; that is all that he is allowed, by analogy 
with relations between men, to say about God. All that the New 
Testament says, am all that faith knows, is the act of God through 
which man becomes capable of self-coanitment, capable of love and 
faith, and capable of authentic life.27 'lbis aspect of Bultmann's 
theology. is so important that we shall quote at length his discussion 
of language as it deals with tbe act of God. We notice especially 
his suggestion that to refer to God otherwise is to speak about an 
idea of God, but not about God Himself: 
When we speak of God as acting, we mean that we are confronted 
with :God, addressed, asked, judged, or blessed by God. There-
fore, to speak in this manner is not to speak in symbols or 
images, but to speak analogically. Por When we speak in this 
manner of God as acting, we conceive God's action as an analogue 
to the actions taking place between men. Moreover, we conceive 
the communion between God and man as an analogue to the communion 
between man and man. It is in this analogical sense that we 
speak of God's love and (p. 69) care for men, of His demands and 
of Hls wrath, of His promise am grace, and it is in this analo-
gical sense that we call Him Pather. We are not only justifi~d 
in speaking thus, but we must do so, since now we are not 
spe~king of an idea about God, but of God Himself. Thus, God's 
love and care, etc., are not images or symbols; these concep.. 
tions mean real experience of God as acting here and aow ••• . 
As applied to God the physical import of the term father has 
disappeared completely; it expresses a purely personal relation-
ship. It is in this analogical sense that we speak of God as 
Pather.28 
Bultmann's use of analogical statements about the "act" of God 
is a kind of demythologizing in the sense that the nafve relation 
to the symbol which characterizes myth is replaced by a conscious 
awareness that symbol is symbol. Bultmann has chosen to speak about 
"a transcendent God present and active in history, 1129 at¥1 to talk 
about such a transcen1ent God ·"even if it is expressed la language 
drawn from human existence, carries a reference which points to a 
:, 
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reality beyond the confines of any existential analysis. 1130 
Bultmann has resorted to speaking of acts of God in the place of 
Mythical statements because of his overriding interest in existen-
tial analysis. Nevertheless, his dealing with a "transcendent 
God" indicates that soMe symbolism will need to be employed, even 
if it is analogous symbolism. 
Bultmann'is torn between his intention to posit every theologi-
cal statement in terms of human existence, and the knowledge that 
the same is impossible when speaking of a transcendent God. He says 
th~t if language about God "is to have any real meaning at all, it 
must denote an act in a real, objective sense, and not just a symboli-
cal or pictorial expression.•31 But he quietly adds a corrective: 
On the other hand, if the action of God is not to·:be : conceived 
as a .,rldly phenomenon capable of being apprehended apart 
from its existential reference, it can only be spoken of by 
speaking simultaneously of myself as the person who is existen-
tially concerned.32 
'lbe gap can be bridged:-by-.-speating of God in terms of the acts of 
man. Por language that talks about the act of God "is ••• neither 
symbolical nor pictorial, though it is certainly analogical, for it 
assumes an analogy between the activity of God aid that of man, and 
between the fellowship of GDd and man and that of man with man."33 
While Bultmann's intention in the process of demythologizing was 
to translate all mythical statements into existential statements, he 
has been forced to leave room for analogical statements as well. Por 
there is a great difference in a statement about human existence, and 
a statement in terms of human existence which is supposed to refer 
analogously to God (as in bis talk of an "act of God"). Macquarrie 
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reminds Bultmann, 
Bither we must say that here there is a limit to demythologizing, 
or else we must redefine the aim of demythologizing, and say 
that it intends to translate myth into existential statements 
plus analogical statements or into consciously symbolic state-
ments, in which the immediacy of the myth has been "broken.1134 
Bultmann is insistent in refusing to admit that talk about an "act 
of Q>d'' is mythological. "Anyone who asserts that to speak of an 
act of Goel at a11·ts mythological language is bound to regard the 
idea of an act of God in Christ as a myth."35 In refusing to admit 
that to speak of God as acting is to speak in mythological terms, 
Bultmann argues that God's act is hidden to the -,rld, but revealed 
to faith and hence not mythological. God's action is not an· act 
which happens between worldly events, but it is to be construed 
as happening within thea ••• Only so-called natural, secular 
(wrldly) events are visible to every man and capable of 
proof. It is within them that God's hidden action is taking 
place.36 
God's action then is not to be construed mythologically, but analogical-
ly. Por it is analogous to the action which occurs within the sphere 
of man's relation to man. 
Since Bultmann has accepted the use of analogy as a valid means 
of symbolizing the transcendent God, we must examine the linguistic 
tool of analogy to determine if Bult•nn can speak analogically aid 
concurrently refuse to be concerned with God's essence apart from a 
confrontation with man. We shall use an analysis of the process of 
analogy made by Prederick Perrt! in Language, Logic, and God. Perrcf 
differentiates between t\10 types of analogy, the analogy of attribu-
tion and the analogy of proport!olUility.37 In analogy of attribution, 
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the prime analogate possesses the characteristic in question in a 
wholly proper (univocal) and actual sense, while the other analogate 
has predicated of it a "like" characteristic in a relative or deriva-
tive sense. In order for this analogy to function properly, there- · 
must be some prior relation between the two analogates by which the 
common attribution is made possible. Usually in theological language, 
Q>d is the creative cause of the finite analogate, and -bis causal 
creativity serves as the prior relation. In sum, the characteristic 
in question can be attributed to the secord analogate in a derived 
sense, based on a prior real relation. The problem with analogy 
of attribution, according to Perre\ is that it is far too permissive; 
based on the prior relation, anything may be said of the second 
analogate in a "derived" sense even though it may not be the case. 
At first glance, Bultmann's use of the analogy of "act" (action) 
does not appear to be an analogy of attribution. If it is an analogy 
of attribution, that is, if statements about God's action are made 
in a derived sense from the univocal sense of man's action, then a 
prior relation between God and man is necessary. In an ordinary 
analogy of attribution within theology, this relation is one of a 
causal nature; this cannot be the case in Bultmann's analogy. If 
''being" is assumed by Bultmann to be the prior relation (although 
this is im1>0ssible, for man has no truly authentic being apart from 
God, ard hence no analogis entis), then we would be permitted to say 
that God's act was like (in a derived sense) man's. But we would 
still have no knowledge of the formal or proper character of the 
analogate "Goel." We are left with a "virtual'' similarity between 
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Q,d's am man's actions. In addition, this type of analogy is far 
too permissive. It 1110uld allow too many predicates to be applied 
analogously to God in a derived sense, or at least more than action 
alone. 
It appears that Bultmann's reference to God's action as analogous 
to man's is an analogy of proportionality, the second type of analogy 
. 
exami-ned by Perre'. In the analogy of proportionality, only one of the 
two analogates deserves to have·predicated of it the common analogue 
in a formal sense. Both of the analogates can have the analogue 
attributed in the literal or umnetaphorical sense, but each possesses 
the analogue proportionately to the nature of the analogate concerned 
(e.g. ''blue" eyes and "blue" sky). Perre suggests tbat the problem 
with this type of analogy is that each of the analogates stipulates 
in which way it agrees with the formal sense of the analogue. In 
doing so, we.move an-even greater distance from the desired equality 
of the analogy. A more serious objection is that there are actually 
two unknowns, not one. Por although we may have a rather precise 
characterization of one unkno,m (e.g. "love" in man if we are ·making 
an analogical statement about God's love), we must try to understand 
God's nature by postulating another entirely different unknown; hence 
we are even farther from the analogy than when we_began. 
If it is true that Bultmann's analogy of God's action is an 
analogy of proportionality, then it is equally true that Bultmann 
does not protect himself from the necessity of practicing "essential" 
theology, try as be may. Por Bultmann, man acts in the formal sense, 
God and man both in the literal or unmetapborical sense. It is the 
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task of existential analysis to describe what the "act" of man 
entails, and Bultmann is able to define what an action of man is. 
One "unknown" is cared for. But the other remains. 'lb define what 
''action" for God1-·means, it will be necessary to postulate another 
"unknown" of God by which we are able to delineate in what way God's 
action agrees with the formal sense of the analogue "action" of man. 
Por Bultmann, this is impossible. Re refuses to speak of any aspect 
of God's nature apart from the "act" of God; and yet, in an analogy 
of proportionality. it is necessary to postulate such "givens" of 
the second analogate in order that the analogue may be delimited 
precisely. If Bultmann wishes to speak of God's action as analogous 
to man's, then he is forced by the logic of analogy to proceed to a 
full theology at once. Bultmann is prepared to utilize the process 
of analogy, but be is unprepared to abide by the laws of its usage. 
To the degree that his use of analogy fa lla short of the logic of 
analogy, it is no less mythological than the New Testament texts 
which he has attempted to demythologize. 
Passing beyond _Bultmann's rather haphazard handling of the tool 
of analogy, we must turn an eye to his analogical statement as it 
stands. It is to be questioned if Bultmann's analogy of the God who 
"acts" does not carry with it an inherent metaphysic. · We take 
John Macmurray seriously when he suggests that if action is strippe~ 
of its intentional character, then it is·a mere process of events; 
if, on the other hand, it retains this intentional character, it .is: 
more than a mere process of events.38 If Bultmann's God who "acts" 
acts without intention, then a mere process of events results. 
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If, on the other band, Bultmann's God who "acts" acts intentionally, 
then Bultmann is committed to a full metaphysical explanation of the 
intention which God has; he is committed to a metaphysic of GDd. 
Bultmann may assert that the analogy is from man to God. If this is 
the case, then either man must be credited with all of the "intentional" 
and directional aspects of action (both God's and man's), or there 
must be a complete absence of "intention" in the action of both God 
and man. 
A final disturbing aspect of Bultmann's use of analogy is his 
insistence that all analogy must begin with man, and proceed from there 
to God. Bven the kerypa is put in terms of God's act as it mirrors 
the action of man. 'lbe Scripture is not so anxious to admit that 
all analogy finds its source in man's action. 'lbe Scripture asserts 
• 
tbat some human speech about God firds its origin in qualities of 
God which have been taken over into human language by the process of 
analogy from Goel to man. A strong case can be -made for the suggestion 
that a man's love for his wife should be analogous to Qirist•s low 
for the Church, and not the other way arounc1.39 In a similar manner, 
the families of the earth are named after the Pather of heaven, not 
the other way around. 40 Gal, as Sovereign ling, had named man "adam"; 
man, sensing an analogous sovereignty over the animals, gave each 
of them a name.41 It is possible to see many of man•s actions in the 
Old Testament (resting on Sabbath, praying, sacrificing, obeying the 
law) as actions performed in imitation of •bis God,42 analogous from 
God rather than towards Him. If God is the source of some analogy, 
then the use of analogy is properly considerecl to be objectification; 
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in that sense; it is not the height of unbelief, but the most sincere 
appreciation and worship of that God who bestows even such gifts to 
be used in His praise. 
We have concluded our investigation of difficulties within 
BultmaM'S theological system. While it is sufficient to realize that 
any ctiticism of his theology is inferentially a criticism of his view 
of language, we wish to pinpoint more explicitly those areas of bis 
language-view affected. It is evident that Bultmann's failure to 
provide clarification for what certainly is a basic assumption (namely 
that man ought to strive to become an authentic being in the first 
place), and his rather imprecise handling of another assumption de~l-
ing with modernity-both alike affect his view of language at the ground 
level. Por bis view of language will be affected directly by tbe pre-
cision or imprecision with which he handles his assumptions. Perhaps 
his inconclusive view of modernity eliminated a segment of language 
that is valuable am valid. His failure, on the other band, to integrate 
the terzgma as an essential element of his system rather than a con-
tiguous accessory will have ruinous effects upon a language-view 
which visualizes the terygma as the primary example and sum total of 
meaningful language. His unwillingness to carry on an exhaustive pro-
cess of argumentation manifests the unstable foundation that underlies 
his view of language. His excessive usage of persuasive language demon-
strates the telescopic approach which his limited language-view aakes 
its own. This exclusive use of persuasive language has isolated 
Bultmann from the very•world of fact to which he had hoped to address 
the kerygma. Finally, his utilization of the analogy of "act" is 
76 
feeble; his view of language (as well as his theology) must begin 
with a discussion of God "in Himself," or else it can make no refer-
ence (even analogically) to the transcendent God Who deigns to invade 
the universe. 
We have reached the point where we can examine Bultmann's theo-
logy, as well as his language-view, from the vantage-point of other 
theologies and philosophies. While our previous analysis of Bultmann's 
thought bas been made from within its own frame of reference, we now 
turn to an analysis from without. The major question is whether or 
not the determinative theology (as well as the resultant language-view) 
which Bultmann has selected is a complete and proper theology. We 
shall approach this problem by examining the deficiencies of existen-
tial analysis as a theology. 1ben we shall turn to "essential" 
theology as a counter-proposal. Pinally we shall see mat light the 
Holy Scriptures cast upon the selection of a determinative theology. 
'lbe question at hand is basically this one: Can exis_tential 
analysis provide a sufficient base upon which to construct the totali-
ty of a theological system? Bxistential analysis begins with the 
knower am analyzes 'Nbat it is that he knows. 'Die Neo-'lbomists of 
our day have called just such a procedure the "subjectivism" of modern 
man.· Neo-Thomism ~• Willing to argue that man suffers from the "Cartesian 
blight." Iver since Descartes philosophy has begun with epistemology, 
with a consideration of how the knower gets to know, and what it is 
that he knows. Neo-Thomistic philosophy asks the appropriate question: 
Is this the proper procedural method? Bultmann, too• begins with what 
Bonboeffer calls "man come of age." Such a man is atheistic. And 
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Bultmann suggests that it is the Church's task to make men once again 
aware of God, for men hav~ dispossessed Him. Bultmann seems to be 
suggesting that the Church is to plead with men to let God back into · 
their minds. 'lbe Church must begin with man, and then go to God. 
But there is another side to the story. It is possible-probable-that 
God has not been put out; He has abandoned the world, and left it. He 
bas withdrawn, and all that remains is the "empty bench" of Arthur 
Miller•s "After the Pall." He -bas left only His wrath. He has given 
to the Qiurch not the task of pleading with man, starting first with 
man's mind as the knowing subject and then proceeding from there. He 
has given the task of proclaialng His transcendence, His wrath, and 
His love. 
Bxlstential analysis provides no basis for a theology in the 
light of the Cartesian blight. Por existential analysis is dependent 
upon its predecessor, phenomenology, aid phenomenology is a vivid 
example of the Cartesian blight. Brown correctly criticises 
Bultmann's selection of existential analysis as bis determinative 
theology when he says: 
Is phenomenology the proper context in which to assess the 
ultimate significance (if.one hesitates over the word "11eta-
physical11) of such concepts as "love-,•• the "thou" (with its 
ethical implication) , and "genuine bistory'•143 
Bxistential analysis prohibits any consideration of God in and 
of Himself, apart from a confrontation with man. Such a procedure is 
dangerous, for it threatens to eliminate any consideration of the wrath-
ful God who bas judged His creatures and found them guilty. Although 
there is a remnant of law-judgment in Bultmann's kerypa, his 
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insistence upon God as the God-of-confrontation is dangerously close 
to Robinson's God as that "segment" of Being which is gracious, and 
only that segment.44 ".Por God to be Q,d, He must be only gracious," ls 
the dangerous prior assumption of this argument. 
The anthropology which existential analysis provides is an incom. 
plete one. Bultmann ignores any suggestion that there is a substaatival 
self. But his constant concern for man in the decisions of life betray 
the existence of some sort of "self" beyond the mere empirical. The 
essence of man for Bultmann is bis will, for man becomes what he 
chooses am desires. 'lberefore, in the terygma, God confronts man's 
will, for Be ··-comes with His demanding and saving revelation in a 
person-to-person relationship.45 Bultmann's description of man as 
will, and bis refusal to speak of a substantival self,li1R& repercussions 
throughout his theology since be bas chosen to speak of God only in 
terms of man's existence. 
Some have accused Bultmann's theology with tbe words, "It has 
taken away my Lord, and I know not where it bas laid Him.•~ These 
words are somewhat sacrilege and overly emotional, and yet they sum 
up the poverty of Bultmann's Christian existential analysis. Malevez 
has accurately described it as reduced to preaching, with no worship 
and no sacrament. 'lbe preaching itself is reduced to this mediocre 
theme: you are forgiven sinners in your decisions. There are no firm 
prospects for the future. There is no foundation in history for the 
act of God. The knowledge which is offered to man prolongs and 
completes a certain ttnatural" knowledge which is immanent in existence 
itself. Bultmann believes it is .in the interest of reason to 
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demythologize tbe message; how then can he im)lO&e silence when this 
same reason asks for the least light on the foundation of belief?46 
Bultmann's theology (and resultant language-view) is incomplete 
not onlj insofar as it relies upon existential analysis alone; it 
also fails to speak of God in any way divorced from man's existence, 
in and of Himself. Bultmann has eliminated any "essential" theology 
both in his dealings with history and in his consideration of natural 
revelation and the Scripture. Bultmann has no room for historical 
facts per se; neither can be speak of a natural revelation of GDd 
apart from the kerre•• In both of these areas, the theology of 
"essence" to which the Church bas committed its.elf for centuries is 
offered up as a sacrifice to an imprecise picture of modernity. We 
shall now consider the inadequacy of Bultmann's theology as it deals 
with history and natural revelation while disregarding any theology 
of "essence~" 
Bultmann deals with history non-dimensionally. The threefold 
dimension of history-past, present, future-bas been collapsed to 
the non-dimensional present realized in the act of proclaiming the 
ke~Y.8!!! here and now.47 ·Bultmann can say that the event which takes 
place in Christ, when demythologized, has no recognizable objective 
(historical) reality. Malevez bas accurately suggested that two 
interpretations of this statement may be made: (1) The divine event 
has an objective reality, but it is unrecognizable to man as such, 
but apprehended by faith (for although God has done something in 
Christ apart from us, we cannot see this "something" or "object," 
~r can we prove it)~ (2) The divine event-has done nothing outside 
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the believer, for the reality of the divine act consists solely 
and wholly in intimate approach to the soul through the preaching 
of the Word.48 Malevez proceeds to argue that an objective (histori-
cal) interpretation of Bultmann's Christ-event is possible: 
Such an interpretation consists in making Bultmann say, in spite 
of his desire for radical demythologizing, that in the divine 
act of salvation there is a certain objectivity manifested 
within history (the saving event has in some way taken place 
outside of man•• sphere) or rather, it reconciles objectivity 
and absolute demythologtzing, for however objecti~e the event 
may be, still it no less absolutely excludes ''myth" in the 
strict sense of the worc1.49 
He then protects Bultmann from those who lft>uld interpret Bultmann's 
Christ-event only subjectively; such people, in interpreting Bultmann, 
say that Christ's death is an indispensable inspiration for the 
existentiell decision. 
But Why is it necessary to refer to the cross? If, in order to 
receive my salvation, I am obliged to refer to Christ as the 
great example, must that -not be because <i>d Himself has express-
ed the type of my authentic existence in the death of Christ? 
If Q>d saves m.e in attaching me in some way to the cross of 
Jesus, is it not because He Himself bas spoken to me from the 
cross? Then on Calvary there must have bee~an objective divine 
manifestation of tbe elements of salvation. 
Malevez tries valiantly to make Bultmann palatable both to·those who 
think he cannot accept objective history and to those who think be 
need not accept objective history. But Malevez fails in bis attempt 
to attribute objectivity (historicity) to the saving event of Christ 
as Bultmann views this event. He says that to accomplish an objective 
interpretation, he must "make Bultmann say"; that is precisely the 
problem. If one follows Bultmann's thought from beginning to end, 
one can see that he is unwilling to speak of any objective historical 
event, or of a God considered objectively in the Christ-event. 
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Malevez has put words in Bultmann's mouth. His suggestion that a 
subjective interpretation of Bultmann's Christ-event is actually 
grounded in an objective interpretation is a suggestion i1hich 
Bultmann could never accept and still reaaia true to existential 
analysis and his presuppositions. 
'lbe problem is that Bultmann is unprepared to speak of any 
history other than present realized history. He has not totally 
dissociated himself from the older liberalism. It would be easier 
for Bultmann to make the statement, "God is loving," than for him to 
confess, "God acted once for all on Calvary when the blood of His 
Son dro~ped to the · ground for man's sake." Por while the first state-
ment is tautologous, an axiomatic deduction, the second~• a statement 
grounded in historical fact. Malevez suggests that Bultmann is will-
ing to make the second statement, while he is hesitant to make even 
the first. 
'Ibis is the point at which the modern linguistic analysts • y 
be of some value for us in this discussion. 'Ibey are not interested 
in discussing the truth or falsehood of a statement; rather, tbey are 
concerned about the prior meaning of a statement. 'Ibey want to know 
What difference it makes-what a statement means-before they will 
progress into a discussion of its falsity or truth. 
Bultmann is concerned to say what the Christ-event means for 
nodern man. His whole process of demythologizing he bas carried on 
in the hope of uking the terypa more meaningful. But at this point 
there ls difficulty. Instead of anchoring the ter7ea in history, h~ 
bas put it into the realized eschatology of the present. 11le Gospel 
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he is trying to make meaningful within the historical lives of men 
is a Gospel not of historical fact, not anchored in God's act within 
time, but a Gospel which is tautologou-• transcendent statement 
bearing close resemblance to the statement ''God is loving.1151 
We have said above that the logical analysts ue asking the 
question, What does it mean? lbey have the right to know what 
difference a proposition or a word makes within man's existence. 
'Dley have the privilege of asking theologians to demonstrate what tbe 
wrd "God" means. lbeologians such as Bultmann have taken up this 
challenge. But Bultmann and other theologians like him who fail to 
give objectivity to the historical facts of the life, death, and 
resurrection of Christ, are unable to demonstrate the meaning of 
"God" in the Christian faith precisely because of their failure to 
begin with an historical base. A theology which is to have meaning 
within the historical lives of men today cannot be a theology based 
on a transcendental axiom of God's love. It will prove meaningless, 
regardless of extensive existential analysis am demythologizing. 
Bultmann's failure to·admit of -historical objectivity in the life, 
death, and resurrection of Christ is disastrous. 111e archetypes of 
his language which symbolize the existentialia may sound modern, 
but in the end_they are meaningless to historical man because .they 
are unhistorical. 
Bultmann fails to reco1nize the validity of essential theology 
not only in his rejection of objectivity in history; he also disregards 
essential theology in his dealings with natural revelation. As we 
bave seen above, Bultmann asserts that man knows nothing of God •~•rt 
83 
from the kerygma. Be follows this course to refrain from any theo-
logical reference apart from the kerygmatic confrontation. But his 
effort to remain aloof from such essential theology seems to be for 
naught. Por it appears that the whole of existential analysis is a 
revelation of God apart from the tertea• Man's recognition of the 
existentialia, unattainable though they are by man's power, is a know-
ledge of God apart from tbe keryP!• Bultmann himself seems to speak 
of natural revelation, in an Augustinian thought-pattern, when be 
asserts that man has a relation to God even before revelation: 
He has a relation to God in his search for God, conscious or 
unconscious. Man's life is moved by the search for Goel because 
it is always moved, consciously or unconsciously, by the ques-
tion about his own personal existence! The question of God and 
the question of myself are identical. 2 
Bultmann will not admit that this "search for God" is natural revela-
tion because to do so \10uld place him under obli1ation to speak of 
this God apart from the kerygma. Ard yet, he is not unwilling to 
speak of such a search. If man searches for God, her:must be endowed 
with some prior knowledge of the God for who■ be searches; the question 
of his own personal existence, if it is identical with the question 
of God, demonstrates some prior knowledge of God. Bultmann is under 
obligation -to discuss in greater detail the essential theology inher-
ent in this natural revelation which he has unwittingly admitted as 
existent. His failure to do so is not only unfair to his own system 
of thought; it is also a rejection of the Christian Church's doctrine 
of God's partial revelation of His essence prior to and apart from 
the Gospel. 
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A consideration of Bultmann's rejection of essential theology 
involves also a brief consideration of his relation to the Scriptures. 
Just as Paul's statement, "If Christ be not raised, your faith is 
vain; ye are yet in your sins,1153 is a statement of indisputable 
history, and so of "e_ssential'' theology, so also Paul's statement 
belongs to the Scripture. Bultmann, as a knowledgeable exegete, 
handles the Scripture with care. But already in bis selection of 
those sections of Sc-ripture to be examined we begin to suspect a · 
deviate at work. He is a re-incarnated Marcion, concentrating 
almost exclusively upon the writings of St. Paul, and selecting as 
his Gospel the Word .of John. 'lbe Old 'n!stament, historical and un-
kerygmatlc as be sees it, is of little value for the Christian exegete. 
Whatever else may be said of Bultmann's handling of the Sc~ipture, 
it is safe to say that his initial approach to it is more Lutheran 
than Reformed in nature. 1b that degree his approach is actually more 
evangelical than some others•. Por Barth's criticism of Bultmann's 
hermeneutics in Kermma and Myth begins with the presupposition of 
the sovereignty of God as its prime consideration?'It seems apparent, 
even in the way that Barth gets ruffled, that Bultmann's apnroach to 
the Scripture bears a closer similarity to the Confessional Law-Goape4 
(problem-solution) character of scriptures than does Barth's. 
Bultmann's hermeneutics considers as primary in one's encounter with 
Scripture the malady of man and the grace of God• al~hough both are 
distorted; he does not first hand us the Scripture, and then proceed 
to swing it about like the s-,rd of the Sovereign lting. Under the 
surface Bultmann still retains some of his Lutheran upbringing.s, But 
his approach to Scripture is but half the story. 
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One cannot agree with Bultmann when he attempts to replace the 
concepts of the New Testament with scientific substitutes gleaned 
from existential analysis. Although Tillich is not complet~Jy correct 
when he says that the myths of the New Testament should be broken and 
recognized as myths• while at the same time "maintained in their 
symbolic form aid not replaced by scientific substitutes,"56 he is 
closer to a correct working method than is Bultmann, with his fashion-
ed replacements. 
Bultmann's collapsed eschatology also affects his approach to 
the Scripture. He feels that the kairos of the New Testament can 
be best explained in terms of the present moment. Such an eschato-
logical approac~ necessitates the use of the scientific substitutional 
forms to which Tillich refers. 'l'hielicte takes Bultmamto task in 
this regard, warning that it is impossible to translate the mythology 
of the New Testament into the language of contemporary myth by sub-
stituting the abstract, monistic, immanent philosophy of existence 
for a kerygma anchored in history. He proceeds to an even more telling 
arg1.111ent (admitting his reliance upon Roman Catholic theologians in 
this matter), suggesting that perhaps with some degree of wisdom God 
specifically chose the time and the mythology of the New Testament 
11fulness" in order to preserve, in the myth of the three-stQried 
universe 1 the i.dea of transendence. "That is what made it peculiarly 
fitted to expresa the otherness of God and his intervention in salva-
tion history. 11S7 Perhaps it was in view of the modern world of sub-
jectivism, the world suffering from Cartesian blight, that God chose 
the time of the New Testament to reveal Himself most dramatically as 
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the Transcemient in the flesh, as God become man in Christ. Perhaps 
the pictures are not to be replaced with scientific substitutes from 
eschatological existential a-nalysis. 
As a final comment on Bultmann's usage of the Scripture, we must 
consider the role of the christocentric approach to Scripture. 
Bultmann has said that no exegesis is presuppositionless. Lutherans 
have agreed, suggesting that all Scripture is to be considered in 
the light of the Gospel-presupposition. The Gospel itself is the Good 
News of the unique union of God and man in the God-man Jesus Christ, 
come to redeem from the law. A cbristocentric approach to the Scrip-
ture is an approach which tates into serious consideration the union 
of divine ard human in Jesus Christ. It is not improper, then, to 
argue that Jesus Christ provides the proper hermeneutic for study of 
the Scriptures. We certainly must 
refresh ourselves at the deep wells of Reformation theology, with 
its insistence that the bypostatic union of the divine and human 
in Jesus Christ is the archettpus of theological speech, and that 
the new humanity of the risen Lord provides us with a kind of 
third dimension beyond our abort4.ve antinomies and dichotomies 
of thought ••• Por this divine-human event not only circumscribes 
theological 1aguage, but positively directs its line of analogi-
cal inference.5 
While we might not accept all of the doctrinal implications of this 
Reformed statement (e.g. 11new11 humanity), its major thrust is certainly 
valid. Por if theologians take seriously in their approach to Scripture 
the God-man Jesus Christ, anchored in history, they will be preserved 
from an exegesis with presuppositions grounded solely in man•s predica-
ment and existence. Bultmann's approach to Scripture lacks both a 
serious consideration of Jesus as God-man, and an acknowledgement of 
His historicity. His approach is not christocenttic as such. 
87 
Our analysis and critique of Bultmann's selected theology has 
led us from a consideration of existential analysis as an incomplete 
theology to a consideration of his rejection of "essential" theology. 
While we have neither the obligation nor the space to demonstrate 
specifically how the critique of his theology affects the language-
view issuing from it, we shall indicate some areas in which further 
study of the effects could be made. If his theology has given birth 
to a specific view of language, a critique of that theology will 
call for a revision of such a language-view. And so, if existential 
analysis bas demonstrated itself to be an incomplete basis upon which 
to construct a full-blown theology; if it fails to do justice to an 
evaluation of the wrath of God; if it partakes in the Cartesian blight 
upon modern man; if it has not the tools with which to bardle the 
metaphysical questions and problems of life; and if it prohibits 
any consideration of God in and of Himself; then surely it is a 
poorly constructed foundation upon which to build one's view of 
language. Por it fails to consider those aspects of language which 
arise from within the existence of -man, but are ruled invalid by 
prior axiom. Bultmann's theology refuses to deal with God "i·n 
essence"; it has a built-in protection against the affirmations of 
history. His language-view too refuses to deal with the "essence" 
of God even though some sort of substantival self is talking, and 
even though thi~ self is seeking for an essential God within existence. 
The denial of historical objectivity denies such a view of language 
the very iistorical force it needs to make the transcendent God 
''meaningful" within the course of man's contemporary histoiy. In 
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addition, Bultmann's view of language has a definite parallel in his 
hermeneutics. Insofar as the Christian Cburcb can accuse him validly 
of an approach to the Scripture made with utter disregard for the 
historical union of God and man in the Lord Jesus Christ, with equal 
validity the Christian Church can accuse his language-view of never 
speaking about the Transcendent Q>d in any event (the kerypa not-
withstarding), but speaking and referring only to and about man. 
Such a charg~ is both serious and straightforward, but it is never-
theless accurate and specific. 
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APPBNDIX A 
Outline of Sermon of May 30, 1943 
('Ibis sermon of Bultmann's was preached on the text of John 16:22-33. 
I-t is taken from 'J.'bis World and Be)'!>nd, pp. 189-200. 'lbe existential, 
-~~lie archetypes are underlined two times. The authentic referents 
~~ QP the right, the unauthentic on the left.) 
Comunication 'th God-Prayer (existence; ge~s
2
ibilit! of ~elation to being) 
possible onl:t •,n t~at day," a,t the ,te:rai}•l eoiat of the age, wbea 
all o ressive roblems are solved; pure JoX (self-understanding in the 
threatened by the 'ltOrld 
temporal 
changes to anxious care 
ha~ obj~ts of joy 
c:ncrete; authentic beln1? 
no threat of removal 
lies beyond the world 
no ob Jee t of joy 
all becomes clear for us 
self-explanatory 
brou ton b freedom (decision for existence in 
the moment) 
bound by ourselves from 
such f reedoa 
self-will 
freedom from ourselves 
open to all encounters of life 
love frees from inner burdens 
no object seek freedom from en-
counter of life 
Unauthentic archetype 
"anxiety" 
freed from unendurable situation 
past gone 
freed from·f~ar and dismay 
comes onl from bein alone in resence of God 
dt;.~th;
1 
r:,,1aced bt enc~u~ter) 
linging to something onfroated by God alone 
covered by rags 
trying to hide 
power of deat 
\tOrld fades away 
eady to bare to God 
o understand ourselves 
relationships loosened 
ossible onl throu h the cross 
;~~:::::::::::::::~lsultlmate solitude o man before God _ urrenders wishes to will of God 
elf-surrender to God 
roved in o enness to encounters of life (D10111ent) 
continued at this point on next page 
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roved in o enness to encounters of life (moment) 
return to life (true sacrifice) 
task in life threat- open and free 
ened, ruined ready to resign to sacrifice 
wretched from loved without fear 
ones leads to genuine encounter with God 
entails ain 
secret joy of the Christian spirit 
shining cross of Christ 
in solitariness before God 
bri •one ression of faith 
. quick, impulsive solid aith grows in expression 
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